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Overview
This doctoral thesis contributes to the field of spatial economics in that it addresses three
research questions which are naturally interrelated with the geographical dimension of the
economic space. This research will address these questions from a theoretical point of view
where some policy prescriptions will also be outlined. To this regard, it embraces three
distinct modelling approaches, belonging to di↵erent strands of the theoretical literature.
The first chapter of the present work deals with the theory of systems of cities, focus-
ing, in particular, on the degree of functional specialisation that the latters may attain in
equilibrium, in the light of Duranton and Puga (2005). With regards to this, my purpose
is to rationalise the existence of regional capitals, which are generally medium-size cities,
and cannot be properly defined as global cities hosting sophisticated/advanced business
services sectors, nor as purely manufacturing cities. The idea is that the reasons for the
emergence of this urban typology may be found in the joint decreasing dynamic of two
types of communication cost: the cost of managing production at distance and the cost
of buying/providing business service at distance, both formally borne by the firms’ head-
quarters facilities. According to this, I present a theoretical model in which the changes
in urban system’s degree of functional specialisation are linked to (i) firms’ organisational
choices, since firms decide whether splitting into headquarter and production plant or
remaining integrated in a single establishment, and to (ii) firms’ location decision with
regards to the proximity with the tradable advanced business services providers. I model
two types of communication costs, one between headquarters and advanced tradable busi-
ness services providers (ABS) and one between headquarters and production plants. The
interplay between the two types of communication costs is shown to have e↵ects on the
transition process from an “integrated” urban system where each city hosts every di↵erent
functions to a “functionally specialised” urban system where each city is either a primary
business center (hosting advanced business services providers, a secondary business center
or a pure manufacturing city and all this city-types coexist in equilibrium.
v
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In particular, I find that (i) maximum functional specialisation of the urban system turns
out to be feasible only if firms face a very high share of the total costs represented by their
heaquarter spending, (ii) in most of the cases the maximum functional specialisation can be
reached only if the economy is already partially specialised, that is, already encompassing
for primary business centers (iii) a non-linear substitution e↵ect between communication
costs: when the extra cost associated to buying advanced business services at distance is
su ciently low, the spatial separation between firms’ headquarters and production plants
is more likely to occur.
As to the theoretical side, this first line of research properly belongs to classical urban
economics, where the inner space of the city is modelled in order to accounting for agglom-
eration and dispersion forces, which lead to city formation and determine the equilibrium
size of cities. In particular, commuting costs, and land rent, which constitute the relevant
variables of the inner city’s spatial dimension are the sole to be explicitly accounted for
into the model. As a consequence, this general equilibrium framework does not encompass
for trade cost and the final good’s market is assumed to be perfectly competitive.
The remaining chapters are concerned with the theory of international trade in which
the spatial component is essentially represented by trade/transport costs.
In particular, the second chapter investigates the impact of free trade on welfare in a
two-country world modelled as an international Hotelling duopoly with quadratic transport
costs and asymmetric countries, where a negative environmental externality is associated
with the consumption of the good produced in the smaller country. Countries’ relative
sizes as well as the intensity of negative environmental externality a↵ect potential welfare
gains of trade liberalisation. In line with Lambertini (1997a) we show that, as long as no
trade policy is undertaken by the government of the larger country, trade liberalisation is
not feasible since the latter always loses from opening to trade. A subsidy policy in favour
of the firm producing the clean good is, on the contrary, shown to give both countries the
right incentives to liberalise trade. Allowing for redistributive transfers between countries
further extends the parametric range for which trade liberalisation is feasible under the
subsidy scheme. The alternative situation, in which the green firm is based in the larger
country, is also briefly sketched to find that free trade does give rise to a global welfare
increment with no need of accompanying trade policies.
The third chapter focuses on the paradox, recently underlined by Collie (2011), by
which, contrary to theoretical predictions, empirical evidence shows that an increase in
trade liberalisation (i.e. a decrease in international transport costs) causes an increase in
vi
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foreign direct investments (FDIs). Here we propose an explanation to this apparent puzzle
by exploiting the approach of Dastidar (1995), which delivers a continuum of Bertrand-
Nash equilibria ranging above marginal cost pricing. In our setting, two Bertrand firms,
supplying a homogeneous good with a convex cost function, enter the market of a foreign
country. We show that allowing for a softer price competition may indeed more than
o↵set the standard e↵ect generated by a decrease in trade costs, thereby restoring FDI
incentives.
vii
Chapter 1
Urban Functional Specialization
and the Interplay between Firm’s
Communication Costs.
1
1. Urban Functional Specialization and the Interplay between Firm’s
Communication Costs.
1.1 Introduction
In the existing theoretical literature on systems of cities, the spatial economies are pre-
dominantly seen as composed by two urban typologies: large and sectorally diversified
cities hosting a highly educated workforce - which is exclusively occupied in managing
tasks or in the service sector - and small and sectorally specialised manufacturing cities.1
As a matter of fact, at the world level, economies encompass di↵erent and more complex
types of urban configurations. In particular, national urban systems are progressively
melting in supranational/international systems where even some large national capitals
- which can be broadly read as business and policy-decision centers - are relegated to a
secondary functional role, while more sophisticated business services, finance, insurance,
real estate (the so-called FIRE) sectors (henceforth advanced business services, ABS),
gather in a little bunch of metropolis (or central business centers, henceforth PBC).
These secondary urban centers, whose size may be characterised by a high variance,
are not production-intensive nor specialised in the service sector, and, at the same time,
sectorally diversified w.r.t. manufacturing. Moreover, they represent a large subset of the
urban universe, seemingly including regional capitals, which compete at some federal level
for subsidies and grants. This may be actually puzzling, unless we give them recognition
of a specific role which may, of course, be linked to non-economic dimensions, such as
political or historical. As an alternative to these “exogenous” explanations we may think
about a specific economic functional role. In order to tackle the problem, it is useful
to observe that these centers are often seen by firms, especially by those belonging to
manufaturing sectors, as the right places for locating their headquarters.
We could then argue why this happens referring to what the recent empirical literature
suggests as headquarters’ location determinants. According to Strauss-Kahn and Vives
(2009), in fact, the managers benefit from the presence of good airport facilities, low
corporate taxes, amenities, such as recreational services, low average wages and high
levels of business services and agglomeration of headquarters in the same sector of activity.
As further stressed by Lovely, Rosenthal, and Sharma (2005), the latter determinant is
explicable by considering the fact that co-location of headquarters reduces the cost of
the informations relative to foreign export makets or, more in general, as pointed out
by Davis and Henderson (2008), benefits are to be accounted to an own sector external
scale e↵ect. Anyway, these authors find out that scale e↵ects alone cannot explain high
concentrations of headquarters in some larger cities, and diversity of local service inputs
1With regards to this issue, see Duranton and Puga (2001).
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(i.e. sharing di↵erentiated standard business banking or equipment leasing services) is
claimed as an additional force leading the agglomeration process. Finally, for Aarland,
Davis, Henderson, and Ono (2007) the firms are attracted by the availability of highly
educated white collars2 while the latters (managers) benefit from a low degree of noise
and pollution with respect to pure manufacturing cities.3
An additional element to be accounted for, is the fact that regional and secondary
national capital cities are generally well connected with large physical communication
(point or network) infrastructures such as highways, railways and airports. With regards
to the latter point, it is worth to recall the importance of the distance-managing cost
for firm’s spatial organisation choice: firms may decide whether split up into production
plants and headquarters (multi-location organisational form) or keep its establishments
together (integrated organisational form) according to its level. As far as this managing
cost is function of the urban accessibility, it also leads headquarters localisation choices:
ceteris paribus, fims will choose to locate headquarters in the best connected city, in order
to keep the managing side relatively close to the production one in a way that minimise
the cost of coordinating the production at distance. The dematerialisation of this cost
component may, on a side, imply a cost reduction - which leads to a proliferation of the
multi-location model - and on the other side, separate the location problem from the
infrastructural endowment of cities, arguably linking it to other variables such as the local
cost of inputs.
At the same time, since advanced business services are an undoubtedly significant com-
ponent of headquarters’ cost function, their tradability also, necessarily, a↵ects headquar-
ters’ location choices. Regional capitals will then become attractive the more the headquar-
ters will be able to buy sophisticated business services from distance. Since the latters are
essentially immaterial, their tradability exclusively involve a transaction/communication
cost, that is, the ability of business services providers to correctly understand and face
firms’ problems from a distant place.
What stated so far would suggest that the dynamics of the managing cost at distance,
and that of the transaction cost between the firm’s headquarter and the advanced busi-
ness services providers are the key determinants of firms’ organisational and localisation
choices. Moreover, this could imply that highly functionally specialised urban configura-
2On the contrary Strauss-Kahn and Vives (2009) find that the level of human capital, as proxied by
the percent of labor force with a bachelor degree is highly correlated with the level of business services and
not significant.
3See also Defever (2006, 2010).
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tions where “manufacturing”, “headquarters” and “advanced/tradable business services”
cities coexist, may be the result of the exploiting of localisation incentives at firms’ level.
Accordingly, the theoretical model on functional specialisation in systems of cities that
I propose here tries to fit the dynamics of urban configuration transformation by assigning
a predominant role to changes in firms’ spatial organisation. I formally lay on the Duran-
ton and Puga (2005) general equilibrium model, with Henderson-type floating-island cities
and agglomeration economies in local (standard) business services and intermediate goods’
producers. In my framework firm organisational choice is not only a↵ected by the level of
communication costs between headquarters and production plants but also by the level of
communication costs between headquarters and advanced business services providers. The
latter feature can be read as the central and innovative one since, as previously underlined,
theoretical literature hardly go beyond a first classification of urban functions (manage-
ment/production) and provide a clear methodological distinction between di↵erent kinds
of business services providers.
In other words, in the present model I let firms decide concerning localisation of head-
quarters with respect to business service providers: firms would move headquarters away
from business services providers only if the additional transaction costs they face in buy-
ing business services from distance is low enough. The interaction between the additional
managing cost due to firms internal spatial separation and the additional transaction cost
due to firms location decision determines the conditons under which the di↵erent urban
configurations are feasible in equilibrium. Both costs are intended as extra headquarter
requirements in case of spatial separation. The decline of managing/communication costs
over the last decades is thus supposed to be the main force delivering the transition from
a functionally diversified urban environment to a specialised one.
While business services’ characterisation has been substantially disregarded in the lit-
erature, only a few among the past theoretical works, apart from the above cited Duranton
and Puga (2005), explicitly deal with the e↵ects of communication costs’ dynamics on the
spatial organisation of consumers/workers and firms at urban system’s level. In particular
Ioannides, Overman, Rossi-Hansberg, and Schmidheiny (2008) make use of the Rossi-
Hansberg and Wright (2007) dynamic model of cities and growth in order to analyze the
e↵ects of ICT on the distribution of city-size. Authors find that increases in the number
of telephone lines per-capita lead to a more concentrated distribution of city sizes and so
to a more dispersed distribution of economic activities in the space (a steeper Zipf curve).
In other words, an improvement in ICT corresponds to a decrease in the number of large
4
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cities. This is substantially due to the fact that improvements in ICT reduce externalities
generated by human capital and employment in an industry and, in so doing, reduce the
incentives for economic activities to agglomerate.
Rossi-Hansberg, Sartre, and Owens III (2009) propose a theory of urban structure that
emphasises the location and the internal structure decision of firms in the light of my
model so as firms can decide whether spatially separating headquarters and operation
plants or keeping them integrated; however this is only possible in di↵erent regions of the
city and no system of cities is modelled. Moreover, authors do not view changes in com-
munication technology as the force underlying changes in urban structure but theyinstead
identify the population growth as the key process. Their model is able to replicate several
empirical regularities regarding the evolution of the urban structures in the largest U.S.
metropolitan areas in the 80s, such as an increase in residents at city centers and city
boundaries, a reduction in the share of employment and residents in the central region of
cities, a concentration of managers relative to non-managers at the center, an increase in
establishments in both areas of the city (city center and edge), a decrease in establishment
shares at the center, a decline in establishment size both at the center and at the edge of
cities.
Another interesting contribution is the theoretical work by Cavailhe´s, Gaigne´, Tabuchi,
and Thisse (2007) which, in order to rationalise urban polycentricity, points on the inter-
play between three types of spatial frictions: trade, commuting and communication costs.
They develop a two-region model in which, for low commuting and communication costs,
intra-city secondary centers may arise to accommodate part of the total urban employ-
ment and, in so doing, alleviate the burden of urban costs without losing those benefits
which stem from agglomeration. In authors’ view, this allows the larger cities to maintain
their predominance even in the presence of fairly low (inter-regional) trade costs which
may in principle favor a relocation of the workforce from the larger and more dense urban
areas to the smaller ones.
Fujita and Thisse (2006) set up a model of firm fragmentation in an international frame-
work with trade costs, their main focus is on the redistributive e↵ects of the process of
fragmentation and/or integration triggered, again, by the dynamics of communication
costs levels. Finally, the work from Wen-Chi (2012) focus on inshoring of business support
services by firms, providing evidences of a process for which these activities are increas-
ingly shifting away from big cities to smaller ones and separating from managerial jobs.
Author provides an explanation based on new ICT technology development, which in-
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creases marginal productivity of workers employed in business services activities even in
smaller or peripheral areas.
Turning back to empirical works, Aarland, Davis, Henderson, and Ono (2007) find that
light manufacturing industries are more likely to spatially separate managing from pro-
duction and that for economies characterised by a significant number of firms belonging to
the non-service sector, with plants in three or more countries, the probability of having a
Central Administrative O ce is very low. The latter result is well fitted by my model since
I show that the spatial equilibrium configuration encompassing integrated firms located in
a di↵erent city w.r.t. business services providers, no further reduction of the remote man-
aging cost can lead to an headquarters and plants separation, except for the case in which
firms are characterised by a very high share of total costs represented by labor directly
employed in their headquarters.4 The same authors point out on two more aspects which
are worth of being mentioned: the first one is that for headquarters, outsourcing is not
properly replacing in-house production since headquarters that outsource legal services,
accounting or advertising have a 2-3-fold higher percentage of employees working inter-
nally at that function; the second one is that between the US counties analyzed functional
specialisation in headquarter activity result to be more frequent in mid-density counties,
while larger ones are less headquarters centers than business services centers exporting
services to the rest of the country. These results reinforce the idea that headquarters
activity and highly specialised business services providers are not spatially inextricable.
Accordingly, Diacon and Klier (2003) document a trend of dispersion of headquarters from
large to medium-sized, fast growing metropolitan areas, especially concerning manufac-
turing firms. The same point is made up by Henderson and Ono (2008) which show how,
across US counties, the relative concentration of headquarters in medium and smaller size
cities contrast with the geographical distribution of business service industries; headquar-
ters are not disproportionately concentrated in large metro areas as commonly thought.
Anyway, the way Audretsch, Falck, and Heblich (2011) interpret these latter results is
opposite to mine. They argue that a considerable number of manufacturing firms choose
not to split their organisation and, consequently, that headquarters in medium-size cities
belong to integrated firms, while I suppose that headquarter dispersion is due to a further
functional specialisation: while advanced business services providers undoubtedly benefit
from agglomerating in large metro areas, headquarters may find regional capitals a better
place.
4So, arguably, except for the case of multi-location firms belonging to the service sector.
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Finally Ono (2003, 2007) uncover the phenomenon of outsourcing business services by
Central Administrative O ces; author find that firms may benefit by separating CAO
from production plants to locate them in larger and thicker local markets and rely on
them to save on outsourced business services.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The model is presented in section 2
while in section 3 equilibrium types and sizes of cities are characterised. Section 4 identifies
the relevant communication costs thresholds and discutes the results. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 The model
I adopt a general equilibrium framework, where consumers/workers inelastically supply
one unit of labor and can choose between occupations and cities while final goods firms
belonging to one of them sector existing in the economy, produce a sectorally homogeneous
good, which is freely traded across cities. The spatial equilibrium is defined by the sizes
and types of the existing cities, where the types are defined on the basis of the degree of
sectoral and functional specialisation of the workforce living in the city.
1.2.1 Preferences
Utility function of the representative consumer is defined over a composite final good M
which is aggregation of the m final goods produced in the economy. Each of this goods
enters with equal shares, in a Cobb-Douglas fashion, in the utility function:
U = f(M) where M =
mY
h=1
(xh)1/m. (1.1)
As in the standard urban economics literature, no measure of the distance between cities
is included in the analysis, that is, cities are intended as “floating islands”. In other words,
there are no distance sensitive trade or transport costs in the market of the final good, nor
workers’ relocation costs.5 This implies that the consumer/worker’s location choice may
a↵ect her utility uniquely via her (nominal) income. The indirect utility of a consumer
working in occupation h in city i then writes as:
Vi =
ehi
P
, (1.2)
5See Fujita and Mori (1997) and Fujita, Krugman, and Mori (1999) for a NEG approach to the systems
of cities in which trade costs between cities are formally taken into account.
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where the price index P for the composite final good is the aggregation of sectoral prices:
P =
mY
h=1
(P h)1/m, (1.3)
while ehi denotes consumption expenditure of an individual living in city i with occupation
h6:
ehi = f(w
h
i , T
h
i , Ri, CCi), (1.4)
where the positive determinants are represented by whi , the wage of an individual living
in city i with occupation h, and T hi , a monetary transfer provided by the city government
(see below), while the total commuting costs CCi borne by the consumer/worker and the
land rent Ri, both function of the consumer location within the city, are the negative
determinants. According to the literature, the latters can be addressed as urban costs.
The maximisation of own consumption expenditure by the individuals determines equi-
librium city size and, obviously, involves individuals’ city choice as well as within city
location choice.
By choosing a city, individuals choose a nominal wage and a level of transfers. More-
over, since the space between cities is not modelled here, the choice of the city is formally
equivalent to the choice of the city-type, where, again, the types are defined over the set
of sectoral and functional characteristics rather than according to spatial fetaures (such
as physical relative distance).7 Then, location inside the city is the sole proper spatial
control variable of individuals’ income. Focusing on the latter amounts to defining the
urban internal spatial structure.
1.2.2 City structure
Each city is composed by a Central Business District (henceforth CBD), where every
economic activity takes place, and a surrounding residence area of unit length. Residents
necessarily commute to the CBD and, in so doing, lost a fraction of their work supply
equal to 2⌧ times the distance of their residence from the CBD, that is z, so that:
CCi = 2⌧z · whi . (1.5)
In this sense, ⌧ must be intended as an iceberg commuting cost. Since lot size is assumed
to be fixed, choosing a location z within the city is equivalent to choosing the level of
6See below for a definition of possible occupations.
7See below for a complete description of city types of the economy.
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urban costs8 to maximise the net income, given the wage and the amount of monetary
transfers.
ehi (z) = w
h
i (1  2⌧z) Ri(z) + T hi . (1.6)
The residents with the same wage, thus facing the same opportunity cost of commuting
time, will have the same bid-rent function and the same willingness to pay for land. Perfect
arbitrage ensures that at residential equilibrium they’ll end up with the same level of the
urban costs so that they will necessarily sort according to their wage, with better paid
workers located close to the CBD.
Moreover, at the residential equilibrium, none of the city residents will have the in-
centive to move from chosen z: high paid workers and low paid ones will face a di↵erent
composition but the same level of urban costs. I call Li the city size (i.e. the number of
its residents), then total land rent is the integral of land rent function over the unit length
city:
Ri =
ˆ Li/2
 Li/2
Ri(z)d(z), (1.7)
where right and left sides of the city are symmetric and accommodate half of the total
city population Li/2; since each resident consumes a single lot of space this is equivalent
to saying that Li/2 represents the maximum distance from the CBD, or the city edge.
1.2.3 Technology
In order to characterise the remaining determinants of individual consumption expendi-
ture ehi , I need to move to the supply side of the model. This does not formally encompass
any localisation economy for the firms which produce final goods. Moreover, since the
market is perfectly competitive and each of these firms earns zero profits in equilibrium,
the agglomeration forces of the model, in the light of Abdel-Rahman and Fujita (1990),
are represented by localisation economies a` la Ethier (1982), that is, aggregate increasing
returns arise from the productive advantages of sharing a large number of local varieties of
intermediate inputs suppliers (see below). Final good firms buy from two di↵erent types
of input suppliers, each one specific to one of their facilities. The final good firms’ tech-
nology, in fact, combines a headquarter and a production plant component (henceforth,
respectively, HQ and PP) so that the Cobb-Douglas production function can be written
8In this sense we do not have here the standard result of the equilibrium population density decreasing
from the the CBD to the urban fringe: consumers/residents cannot trade more space for housing against
a lower accessibility to the CBD given fixed lot size. This also implies that the land rent at the city edges
is not zero; in the model it is thus normalised to zero without loss of generality.
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as:
xh = (xhhq)
⌘(xm+hpp )
1 ⌘ (1.8)
where xh denotes output of a firm belonging to sector h with h = 1, ...,m, while xhhq and
xm+hpp are, respectively the quantities of HQ’s and PP’s service inputs.
9 Unit production
cost function thus writes as:
ch =
⇣
Hh
⌘⌘ ⇣
Qm+h
⌘1 ⌘
(1.9)
where Hh represents the HQ’s sub-cost while Qm+h the PP’s one.
Each of the firm’s facilities (HQs and PPs) use specific intermediate inputs: in the
case of HQs these are business services (banking and legal services, advertising), and these
outsourced business services and HQs specific labor force (managers) enter the Cobb-
Douglas production function with shares µ and 1   µ respectively. The relative sub-cost
function is therefore specified as:
Hh = (wh)µ(Q0)1 µ (1.10)
where whi is the unitary labor cost in city i and sector h while Q
0
i is business services’
composite price index.10 For what concerns the PPs, the only inputs which enter in the
sub-production function are the sector specific intermediates, which can be broadly read
as semi-processed products or technical components of the final good. The PP sub-cost
function Qm+hi therefore coincides with the composite price index for intermediates.
I can thus say that the model encompasses 2m+ 1 occupations for workers: workers may
be directly occupied in the headquarters of sector h, in the production of business services,
or in the production of intermediates specific to sector h.
The mass of varieties of business services produced in city i is endogenously determined
and indicated as s0i and all varieties enter in the headquarters’ technology with constant
elasticity of substitution (✓ + 1)/✓, where ✓ > 0. The relevant price index of business
services can therefore be expressed as:
Q0i =
"ˆ s0i
0
[q0i (k)]
 1/✓
# ✓
(1.11)
9Superscript m + h is always assigned to variables which refers to PPs while those referring to HQs
are indexed with h with h = 1, ...,m.
10The superscript 0 always refers to the business services sector. Note that the fact that the superscript
h = 0 is associated with business services’ variables is due to a specific assumption of the model: while
the intermediates used by the PPs are sector-specific, the same business services are used by the HQs in
all sectors.
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where q0i (k) is the price of variety k of the business services produced in city i. While the
cost function of a firm producing a single variety is:
C0i (k) =
⇥
↵0 +  0y0i (k)
⇤
w0i (1.12)
where y0i (k) denotes firm’s output, ↵ and   respectively denotes the fixed and variable
labor requirements.11
Since the cost function relative to a single variety involves a fixed labor requirement and
since all the varieties of both business service suppliers and intermediate producers enter
in the final good production function with the same constant elasticity of substitution
(respectively (✓+1)/✓ and (✏+1)/✏), the more labor is employed in the specific intermediate
sector or in the business service sector, the more varieties will result in equilibrium and
will therefore lower the correspondent composite price.
The process of specialisation is limited by the size of the labor market li as well as by the
presence of a fixed component of the unit labor requirement ↵. The equilibrium number
of varieties also rises with the degree of product di↵erentiation which characterise the
sector (higher ✓, ✏). This e↵ect results as clearer if we express the production plant and
headquarter sub-cost functions as:128<:Q
m+h
i =
⇣
lm+hi
⌘ ✏
wm+hi
Q0i =
 
l0i
  ✓
w0i
(1.13)
Where lm+hi and l
0
i represent the net labour available for production in city i.
13 The
degree of localisation economies, that is the increasing returns at the sector-city level (or
the cost advantages stemming from co-location of inputs producers belonging to the same
sector) is thus increasing with ✏ and ✓. Since Q0i and Q
m+h
i enter the Cobb-Douglas
production function of HQs and final good firms, it is useful to define   = ✓(1   µ), and
  = ⌘ +(1 ⌘)✏ where   and ✏ indicate the localisation economies for business services and
intermediates while   indicates the average localisation economies. These parameters may
thus be interpreted as a direct measure of the elasticities of the local sectoral productivities
to the sector specific workforce: the higher   and ✏, the stronger will be the negative e↵ect
of a marginal increase in the local workforce on the relevant price index of intermediate
inputs.
11To obtain corresponding definitions for intermediates entering PPs production function is su cient
to replace superscript 0 with m+ h and ✓ with ✏ > 0.
12See Duranton and Puga (2005) Lemma 1 and 2.
13Remember that each individual inelastically supply one unit of labour but have to commute to the
city CBD to e↵ectively work in a firm. This implies that a fraction ⌧ of the total city work supply get lost
and
P2m
h=0 l
h
i = Li(1  ⌧Li).
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Since both HQs and PPs have a physical location (we identify the location of a final
good firm with the location of its headquarter), the final good entrepreneurs belonging to
di↵erent sectors face the same organisational problem that is choosing between a spatially
integrated or multi-location organisational form, but they also face a location problem,
that is choosing to locate headquarters in the same city where advanced business services
(ABS) are located (the PBC), or in a di↵erent city. In fact, as already pointed out in section
1, di↵erently from the standard business services (SBS) and the intermediates, ABS are
tradable, in that HQs can make use of ABS provided by firms located in a di↵erent city by
facing a fixed communication cost. Correspondingly, there are four possible cost functions
for the firm belonging to the sector h, having its HQ in the city i :14
1. Integrated Firms in the PBC:
Chi,i,i =
⇣
Hhi,i,i
⌘⌘ ⇣
Qm+hi
⌘1 ⌘
xhi,i,i =
h⇣
whi
⌘µ  
Q0i
 1 µi⌘ ⇣
Qm+hi
⌘1 ⌘
xhi,i,i; (1.14)
2. Integrated firms, outside the PBC:
Chi,i,z = (K)
⌘ ·
⇣
Hhi,i,i
⌘⌘ ⇣
Qm+hi
⌘1 ⌘
xhi,i,z; (1.15)
3. Multi-location firms with HQ in the PBC:
Chi,j,i = (⇢)
⌘ ·
⇣
Hhi,i,i
⌘⌘ ⇣
Qm+hi
⌘1 ⌘
xhi,j,i; (1.16)
4. Multi-location Firms with HQ in the SBC:
Chi,j,z = (K · ⇢)⌘ ·
⇣
Hhi,i,i
⌘⌘ ⇣
Qm+hi
⌘1 ⌘
xhi,j,z; (1.17)
where ⇢ > 1 and K > 1 are the iceberg-type extra-headquarter costs respectively asso-
ciated with the transmission of headquarter services to a PP located in a di↵erent city
(the managing costs) and with the transmission of business services from business services
suppliers to headquarters located away from the PBC (the transaction costs). A multi-
location firm is thus supposed to face both these iceberg costs and has its headquarter
sub-cost function multiplied by a factor ⇢ ·K > K, ⇢.
14First subscript indicates the city where firm’s HQ is located, the second the city where PP is located
and the third indicates the PBC.
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1.3 City formation
In section 1.2 I have defined the consumption expenditure income of a consumer/worker
in the spatial economy (see equation (1.6)) and this has been shown to be function of both
spatial and market features. Since individuals face no spatial relocation costs and no costs
in shifting from an occupation to another, they will move to the city which grants them
the higher wage and the lower urban costs. A spatial equilibrium is then reached when
a consumer has no incentive to move from a city to another; from the model’s assump-
tions on consumers preferences, this means that she/him will get the same consumption
expenditure income everywhere, given the location choices of other consumers and the
organisational and location choices of firms. In the model, attraction and repulsion forces
- which are the basis of cities’ existence - are thus exclusively a↵ecting consumers/workers:
the agglomeration economies, in fact, stem from the gathering of an occupation-specific
workforce, while the countervailing (dispersion) force is represented by the commuting
costs.15
In the present model, a “land development companies” mechanism leads to the forma-
tion of cities and, therefore, determines equilibrium city sizes.16 The prefectly competitive
land development companies (henceforth LD) seek to maximise total land rent in the city
by choosing a population target and an occupation specific monetary transfer scheme. The
latter is defined as the (2m+1)-dimensional vector Ti = {T 0i , T 1i , ..., T hi , ...Tmi , ..., Tm+hi , ..., T 2mi }
whose components represent the amount of money which a worker will get from the LD if
she/him moves to the city i. This amounts to saying that each LD maximises the following
objective function:
max
{Lhi ,Thi }
⇧i, ⇧i = Ri  
2mX
h=0
Lhi T
h
i
subject to workers in each active occupation in the city obtaining the highest consumption
income available elsewhere, e¯:
Lhi e
h
i = L
h
i e¯, L
h
i   0
15No final goods’ price index e↵ect, which is the one acting as dispersion force in the standard framework
of the New Economic Geography, is modelled here, since final good is homogenous and freely traded across
locations.
16With regards to this issue see Henderson and Becker (2000). In the literature, two main approaches to
city formation and size may be distinguished: self-organisation and perfectly competitive land development
companies. The main advantage of the latter setting lies on the fact that it allows to get rid of ine cient
spatial equilibria arising under coordination failure between agents.
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and subject also to firms adopting each of the possible configurations breaking even.17
Moreover, following Duranton and Puga (2005), developer’s programme may be rewritten
as:
max
lhi
⇧i, ⇧i =
2mX
h=0
whi l
h
i   Lie¯ (1.18)
subject to (A.1-A.6), lhi   0 and
P2m
h=0 l
h
i = Li(1  ⌧Li). From (1.18)
If the break even conditions for final good firms hold, one can state what follows.
Lemma 1 [Multi-location HQs and PPs separation.] In equilibrium, the stand alone head-
quarters and the stand-alone production plants belonging to any type of multi-location firms
(i.e. those with HQs in the PBC and those with HQs outside the PBC) do not coexist in
the same city.
Proof. The HQs of a multi-location firm which are located outside the PBC cannot
co-exist with the PPs of a di↵erent multi-location firm. In fact, this would imply that
an integrated firm located in the same city would have the chance to get HQ’s and PP’s
services at the lowest cost though saving the communication cost associated to the man-
aging at distance. As a consequence, this firm, would make positive profits equal to
P h   (Hhi,i,i)⌘(Qm+hi )1 ⌘ = (1  1/(K⇢)⌘)P h > 0, which contradicts (A.1-A.2).
While the latter Lemma rules out the city types encompassing stand-alone HQs and
stand-alone PPs (i.e. if a city is supposed to host both facilities, then these must be-
long to the same integrated final good firm), from the definition of the maximisation
problem in (1.18)18, we can exclude the co-presence of integrated firms and HQs or PPs
belonging to multi-location firms. That is, whether in the PBC or not, in equilibrium,
integrated firms cannot co-exist with either HQs or PPs of multi-location firms belonging
to the same sector. This leads to the definition of the the city-types which are feasible in
equilibrium:
(a) HQs (belonging to multi-location firms) and business service suppliers of both types;
(b) HQs of multi-location firms;
17This implies that each firm’s establishment, whether it is a production plant a headquarter of a multi-
location firm or an integrated firm, has to break even, wherever it is located. See Appendix 1.A for the
definition of the necessary conditions associated to all the possible cases.
18See also (B.14) for a di↵erent formulation of the maximisation problem. From this it also results as
straightforward the result for which each city end up as sectorally specialised in equilibrium, regardless of
the degree of functional specialisation associated to each of the feasible urban configurations.
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(c) PPs (belonging to multi-location firms) and intermediate suppliers;
(d) integrated firms, business service suppliers of both types and intermediates suppliers;
(e) integrated firms and intermediates suppliers;
(f) ABS suppliers.
Note that, from now on, this labeling will also characterise city-type specific variables (as
an example, La will be unsed to indicate th total equilibrium population of a city hosting
HQs and business service suppliers). I may now determine equilibrium city sizes:
Lemma 2 [Equilibrium city sizes] The spatial equilibrium city-sizes are
La =
 
⌧(1 + 2 )
, Lc =
✏
⌧(1 + 2✏)
, Ld =
 
⌧(1 + 2 )
,
Lb =
1 + µ
⌧(1 + 2µ)
, Le =
✏(1  ⌘)
⌧ [1 + 2✏(1  ⌘)] , Lf =
 
⌧(1  µ+ 2 ) .
Proof. See Appendix 1.C.
Once defined city types and the relative sizes I can define the equilibrium configurations
as, alternatively, encompassing:
1. only type (d)-cities (firms face the cost function of (1.14));
2. type (e) and (f) cities (firms face the cost function of (1.15));
3. type (a) and (c) cities (firms face the cost function of (1.16));
4. type (e), (f) and (c) cities (firms face the cost function of (1.17)).
Figure 1.1 represents the four equilibrium configurations. Dotted lines indicate integrated
firms, while arrows indicates additional costs ⇢ and K faced by headquarters under di↵er-
ent spatial equilibria.
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Figure 1.1: Spatial economy’s feasible equilibria
1.4 Urban configurations and the interplay between
communication costs
1.4.1 Communication costs’ thresholds
The following proposition identifies the conditions, expressed in terms of the level of the
two communication costs, under which the four configurations listed in the latter section
will result as equilibrium outcomes.
Proposition 1 [Equilibrium firm organisation and urban structure] For ⇢ > ⇢ˆ, where
⇢ˆ =
"
(1 + 2 )1+2  ⌘ ✏(1 ⌘)✏
   [⌘ (1 + 2 )1+2 ]⌘ [(1  ⌘)✏(1 + 2✏)1+2✏]1 ⌘
#1/⌘
(1.19)
then all firms adopt the fully integrated organisational form of (1.14), and all cities spe-
cialise by sector, hosting headquarters, production plants, business services and interme-
diates suppliers. If instead ⇢ < ⇢ˆ, then all firms adopt the partial multi-location organisa-
tional form of (1.16) keeping headquarters in the business service center, with a share
⌘✏(1 + 2 )
⌘✏(1 + 2 ) + (1  ⌘)(1 + 2✏) 
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of cities hosting headquarters and business services suppliers, and the rest of cities hosting
production plants plus intermediate suppliers.
For K > Kˆ, where
Kˆ =
"
(1 + 2 )1+2  [✏(1  ⌘)]✏(1 ⌘)[1  (1  µ)⌘]1 ⌘(1 µ)(1  µ)⌘(1 µ) ⌘ 
(1 + 2    µ)⌘(1+2  µ)[1 + 2✏(1  ⌘)]1+2✏(1 ⌘) ⌘(1 µ)  µµ⌘⌘⌘ 
#1/⌘
(1.20)
then all firms adopt the fully integrated organisational form of (1.14) and all cities spe-
cialise by sector, hosting headquarters, production plants, business services and interme-
diates suppliers. If instead K < Kˆ, then all firms adopt the partial multi-location organi-
sational form of (1.15) (keeping headquarters together with production plants while facing
an additional cost to get business services from outside the city) with a share
✏⌘(1  µ)(1 + 2    µ)
✏⌘(1  µ)2 +   + 2✏ (1  µ⌘)
of PBC, and the rest of cities hosting headquarters, production plants and intermediate
suppliers.For ⇢ < ⇢ˆ and K < Kˆ all firms necessarily adopt the multi-location organisa-
tional form of of (1.17).
For K < Kˆ and ⇢ > ⇢, where
⇢¯ =
"
[1 + 2✏(1  ⌘)]1+2✏(1 ⌘) ⌘(1 µ)[1  (1  µ)⌘]⌘(1 µ) 1(µ2⌘)µ⌘
(1  ⌘)2✏(1 ⌘)+⌘µ(1 + 2✏)(1+2✏)(1 ⌘)[(1 + ✏)(1 + 2µ)]µ⌘
#1/⌘
(1.21)
then all firms adopt the partial multi-location organisational form of (1.15). If instead
⇢ < ⇢, then all firms shift from the organisational form of (1.15) to that of of (1.17) with
a share
✏(1  µ)(1 + µ)⌘(1 + 2    µ)
✏(1  µ)2(1 + µ)⌘ + ✏[2 + µ(2  ⌘)] + (1 + µ)(1  ⌘) 
of PBC hosting only business services suppliers, and a share
✏µ⌘ (1 + 2µ)
✏(1  µ)2(1 + µ)⌘ + {✏[2 + µ(2  ⌘)] + (1 + µ)(1  ⌘)} 
of cities hosting only headquarters. If ⇢ < ⇢ˆ and K > K¯, where
K¯ =
"
(1  µ)⌘(1 µ)µµ⌘(1 + 2 )⌘(1+2 )
(1  µ+ 2 )⌘(1 µ+2 )(1 + 2µ)⌘µ
#1/⌘
(1.22)
then all firms adopt the partial multi-location organisational form of (1.16). If instead
K < K¯, then all firms shift from the organisational form of (1.16) to that of (1.17).
Proof. See Appendix 1.D.
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1.4.2 Discussion
In the latter subsection I have presented the main result of the paper, which consists in the
identification of the communication costs critical levels (1.19-1.22). According to the model
hypotesis, held constant the magnitude of the localisation economies, the emergence of one
of the four feasible types of system of cities is determined by the level of communication
costs faced by firms. The way communication costs a↵ect firms decisions depends on the
starting urban configuration, that is, co-location of headquarters and ABS is a↵ected by
the level of the additional cost of buying ABS from distance, but also by the level of
the managing cost. The reverse relation is also proven to hold: even firms’ integration is
a↵ected by both communication costs. Thus headquarters’ location w.r.t. ABS a↵ects the
organisational decision of firms. This amount to saying that:
⇢⇤ ⌘
8<:⇢ˆ 8K > Kˆ⇢¯ 8K < Kˆ ; K⇤ ⌘
8<:Kˆ 8 ⇢ > ⇢ˆK¯ 8 ⇢ < ⇢ˆ .
Where ⇢⇤ and K⇤ represents the relevant thresholds. Moreover, note that since we have
not so far imposed any restriction on the parameters’ values, nothing in the model pre-
vents each threshold to assume values below unity. This would obviously imply their
non-existence. In fact, in the presence of a threshold below unity, the correspondent
communication cost should turn negative in order to deliver any spatial separation. Fur-
thermore, the relative position of each of the four thresholds is not a priori defined, so
that, in principle, K¯ Q Kˆ and ⇢¯ Q ⇢ˆ. Figure 1.2a illustrates the four feasible urban
configurations (with correspondent city-types in parenthesis) as functions of the levels of
communication costs ⇢ and K, in the space definded by ⇢ > 1 and K > 1.
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6
-
⇢
K
(1; 1)
1 [d]
3 [e, f ]
2 [a, c]4 [b, f , c]
⇢⇤⇢ˆ
⇢¯
K⇤
Kˆ K¯
Figure 1.2a: Feasible spatial configurations and relevant thresholds
According to what stated so far, if the ABS communication cost K falls below the thresh-
old Kˆ, while the managing cost ⇢ stays above the threshold ⇢¯, the economy shifts from
the integrated configuration 1 to the configuration 3, where firms adopt an integrated
organisational form but locate in a di↵erent city w.r.t. the ABS providers. Once this
equilibrium is reached, no further decrease of K can deliver the urban configuration of
maximum functional specialisation 4: firms’ separation into headquarters and production
plants is worthwhile for the economy only if ⇢ falls below ⇢¯.
On the other side, only if K stays above Kˆ and ⇢ falls below ⇢ˆ the economy shifts from
the integrated configuration 1 to the configuration 2 where firms split into PPs and HQs
but keep the latters in the PBC. Starting from this partially specialised configuration, no
further decrease of ⇢ can lead to maximum functional specialisation 4: only a decrease
of K under the threshold K¯ pushes headquarters away from the PBC. Thus, in order
for maximum functional specialisation to be a feasible spatial equilibrium, the conditions
K < K¯ and ⇢ < ⇢¯ have to be jointly met.
However, figure 1.2a is not the unique representation of equilibrium configurations in
the ⇢ -K parameters’ space. From Proposition 1, in fact, each threshold is a function of
the parameters  , ✏,  , µ and ⌘. Thus, according to their values, a situation in which
Kˆ > K¯ and/or ⇢ˆ > ⇢¯ may arise.
In order to provide a numerical example, we may assume the following: ✓ = 0.2, ✏ = 0.05,
µ = 0.6 and ⌘ = 0.2. This amount to saying that a 1% increase in employment in a city
hosting ABS raises local productivity by 1.08% (note that   = ✓(1   µ) = 0.08) while a
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1% increase in employment in a city hosting PPs and intermediates suppliers raises local
productivity by 1.05%. Moreover, the share of the total firm’s cost represented by head-
quarters’ services is quite low (20%) and the workforce directly occupied in the headquarter
account for the larger part of the corrsepondent sub-cost function (60%)19. In correspon-
dence of these parameters’values, we find that ⇢ˆ = 1.17, Kˆ = 1.15, ⇢¯ = 0.22 and K¯ = 0.51.
This results depict a spatial economy in which urban configuration 4 is not sustainable for
any level of ⇢ and K (figure 1.2b).20
6
-
⇢
K
(1; 1)
1 [d]3 [e, f ]
2 [a, c]A(3,2)
⇢⇤⇢ˆ = 1.17
K⇤
Kˆ = 1.15
Figure 1.2b: Feasible spatial configurations and relevant thresholds
for ✓ = 0.2, ✏ = 0.05, µ = 0.6 and ⌘ = 0.2
Note that the parameters’ space represented by area A in figure 1.2b may, alternatively,
deliver configuration 3 or 2 depending on the starting levels of ⇢ and K. This implies that
once reached configuration 3 or 2 from 1, no further decrease of ⇢ or K, respectively below
⇢ˆ and Kˆ, may lead to a di↵erent spatial equilibrium. This latter result is particularly
interesting, since it entails a sort of spatial lock-in e↵ect. Since this e↵ect arises when
⇢¯ < 1 < ⇢ˆ or K¯ < 1 < Kˆ, it is useful to investigate under which parameters’ ranges the
latters conditions hold. To this regard, repeated numerical simulations have shown that:
(i) ⇢ˆ   1 for all admissible paramers’ values.;
19In the following I always assume that µ   0.6 which is consistent with the empirical results provided
by Aarland, Davis, Henderson, and Ono (2007).
20In the limit case in which all the thresholds are below unity, neither configurations 2 and 3 are
feasible and the spatial economy is necessarily characterised by cities of the integrated type d: sectoral
specialisation and no functional specialisation.
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(ii) ⇢¯ > 1 for ⌘   0.8;
(iii) if ⇢¯ > 1 holds, then ⇢¯ > ⇢ˆ also holds;
(iv) K¯  1 for all admissible paramers’ values;
(v) Kˆ > 1 for   > 0.01.
I start by analysing the former three points which concern the managing cost ⇢. With
regards to this, in Figure 1.3, ⇢¯ and ⇢ˆ are plotted as functions of ⌘.
6
-
⇢
⌘
(0; 0)
0.5
1
1.5
2
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
⇢ˆ
⇢¯
Figure 1.3: Determinants of ⇢-thresholds given ✏ = 0.05 and µ = 0.6
I.e., held constant the values of the remaining parameters, ⇢¯ > 1 for all ⌘ > 0.8, while
⇢ˆ > 1 holds in the whole admissible parameters’ range. The conclusion that we can draw
from this result is that configuration 4 is feasible if and only if ⌘ > 0.8. Moreover, (point
(ii)) for su ciently high values of ⌘, a substitution e↵ect between ⇢ and K exists in shifting
from 1 to 4 via 3. This amounts to saying that the lower ⇢, the more likely is for HQs to
locate away from PBC.
In fact, if we assume that ⌘ = 0.8, we have that ⇢ˆ = 1.04 and ⇢¯ = 1.08: the shift from
configuration 1 to 2 then becomes feasible if the additional cost of managing production
from distance falls below 4% of the managing cost for an integrated firm, while an 8%
threshold is fixed w.r.t. the shift from configuration 3 to 4. As ⌘ rises this substitution
e↵ect rises, together with the spread between ⇢¯ and ⇢ˆ. In order to better understanding
why this happens, let’s focus on the determinants of both thresholds, starting from the
case of ⇢ˆ. According to the simulations’s results, and limiting the analysis to the relevant
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case ⌘   0.8 in order to keep things simple, we have that:
@⇢ˆ
@ 
> 0, 8   2 [0, ✏
2
];
@⇢ˆ
@⌘
< 0;
@⇢ˆ
@✏
> 0. (1.23)
Note that from (1.23), the intuitive result for which the more localisation economies in the
ABS sector, the more the multi-location firm’s organisational form is supposed to become
worthwhile, holds as long as   < ✏2 . In order to understanding why the magnitude of these
localisation economies have to keep low relative to those associated to the production of
intermediates we may consider, first of all, that we are restricting the analysis to a portion
of the parameters’ space in which ⌘ is relatively high. In this specific case, the benefits
accruing to firms from the geographical separation between HQs and PPs are very low
(@⇢ˆ@⌘ < 0), since local productivities are not significantly hindered by the mixing between
the di↵erent workforces which arises in case of spatial integration. The latter consideration
is confirmed by the sign of the following cross derivatives w.r.t. ⌘:
@⇢ˆ
@ @⌘
< 0;
@⇢ˆ
@✏@⌘
< 0.
These imply that a rising ⌘ lowers the e↵ect exerted by the localisation economies on the
firm’s organisational decision. Secondly, as   rises, the congestion associated to the a-type
cities rises more than proportionately than that associated to the d-type ones.
For what concerns ⇢¯ instead, the sign of the derivatives can be determined on the whole
parameters’ range. Accordingly, we have that:
@⇢¯
@ 
= 0,
@⇢¯
@⌘
> 0 8 µ 2 [0.15, 1]; @⇢¯
@µ
> 0 8 ⌘ 2 [0.8, 1]; @⇢¯
@✏
< 0 8 ⌘ 2 [0.8, 1]. (1.24)
Note that the derivative w.r.t. the parameter   is null. This threshold is in fact associated
to the shift from configuration 3 to 4, which entails spatial separation between HQ and
PP, while ABS are already agglomerated in the same city (f-type). Firms has thus just
exploited the localisation economies represented by  , that is, they have benefit from
the increase in productivity which stems from locating HQs away from business services.
Figure 1.4 illustrates the results in (1.24).
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Figure 1.4: Determinants of ⇢¯ given ✏ = 0.05 and µ = 0.6
Thus, as far as ⌘ < 0.8, this threshold is decreasing in µ and increasing in ✏ while the
opposite is true for ⌘ > 0.8. To understand why this happens, consider that Lemma 2 also
implies:21
Lb > Lf > La > Ld > Lc > Le
so that shifting from configuration 3 to 4 is not only associated to a lower price for
intermediates22 but also to a higher level of congestion, since Lb + Lc > Le always holds.
A higher number of workers directly occupied in the HQs thus entails an increase in
the size of b-type cities.23 When ⌘ < 0.8 this is su cient to explain why a higher µ is
supposed to negatively a↵ect the threshold value ⇢¯, while the intuition for the sign of @⇢¯@✏ is
straightforward: a higher degree of localisation economies, favour firm’s spatial separation.
Anyway, once ⌘ is su ciently high, µ becomes a positive determinant of the level of ⇢¯.
This happens nothwithstanding the fact that a higher µ is still associated with larger b-
type cities. This loss in terms of congestion associated to the shifting to configuration 4,
in fact, is now more than compensated by a gain in terms of higher localisation economies
for the production of intermediates. That is, the change in the sign of @⇢¯@µ is due to
the fact that an higher ⌘ has a negative e↵ect on the degree of localisation economies
21In particular, for any value of µ, ⌧ and for   > ✏ , Lb > Lf > La > Ld > Lc > Le holds, while for
  < ✏ and for 1  10  < µ < 1 , Lb > Lf > Lc > Ld > La > Le holds.
22This is due to the fact that in configuration 4 the co-existence of HQs and PPs is avoided and the
model only encompasses localisation economies for intermediates producers.
23Note that   is an inverse function of µ, so that a rise in µ is necessarily associated to a lower degree of
localisation economies in the ABS sector. Notwithstanding this, we have already explained that changes
in   do not a↵ect the feasibility of configuration 4 starting from 3.
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in configuration 3, since it jointly reduces the size of e-type cities and increases their
share of headquarters workforce. As a consequence, a rise of µ, as well as a decrese
of ✏, exacerbates this negative e↵ects thereby favouring the urban configuration which
encompasses for maximum functional specialisation.
To sum up, if HQ’s sub cost function represents a su ciently large share of total cost
function and, moreover, if the labor force directly employed in HQs is a su ciently high
share of the headquarters’ sub-cost function, the potential gains for firms and LDs which
stem from shifting from configuration 3 to 4 are greater than the losses, and the threshold
is greater than unity. In the opposite case, the shift from 3 to 4 would not free enough
resources with respect to the additional congestion it would induce, and the threshold
would thus be likely to disappear. The spread between the two thresholds (⇢¯   ⇢ˆ) only
a↵ects the extent of the (⇢,K) range in which configuration 4 is feasible and represents a
good measure of the degree of substitutability between the two types of communication
costs. This spread is supposed to be strictly increasing in the magnitude of localisation
economies, that is, in   and ✏. This is essentially due to the fact that while ⇢ˆ is stricly
decreasing w.r.t. the latters, ⇢¯ is constant over   and, moreover, | @⇢¯@✏ |<| @⇢ˆ@✏ | for all the
admissible parameters’ values.
We may now move to point (iv) and (v), which concern the remaining thresholds Kˆ
and K¯. Point (iv) implies that the only way an economy may reach configuration 4 is
through 3, provided that ⇢¯   1. In di↵erent terms, multi-location firms won’t ever find
it profitable to move HQs to a SBC. This result is particularly significant: as far as we
accept the hypothesis that change in the spatial organisation of firms are predominantly led
by the exogenous dynamics of communication costs, it implies that some urban systems
may result stuck in a partially specialised spatial equilibrium as long as the remaining
determinants, which attain to the degree of substitutability between varieties and to the
cost functions of final good firms, do not change. Furthermore, point (v) allows us to
conclude that, unless the localisation economies associated with ABS are very low, a
transition from the integrated configuration 1 to 2 is always feasible. The level of Kˆ is
obviously strictly increasing in   and ⌘.
Finally, in order to further characterise single equilibrium configurations, in the follow-
ing table I present the shares of each of the city type, given the benchmark parameters’
values.
By comparing configuration 3 with 4 we can clearly notice that, fixed the number of
cities specialised in business services, no sensible change occurs in the number of cities
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Configuration
2 3 4
La 0.16 - -
Lb - - 0.01
Lc 0.84 - 0.96
Le - 0.97 -
Lf - 0.03 0.03
Table 1.1: Shares of total cities for city-type and equilibrium urban configuration
specialised in the production of intermediates: from 97% to 96%. The remaining 1% is
represented by headquarters’ urban centers. Configuration 2 is instead characterised by a
lower degree of spatial agglomeration, due to the equilibrium dimension of a-type cities,
which is significantly lower than that of f-type and b-type ones.
1.5 Concluding remarks
The model presented in this paper extends the work of Duranton and Puga (2005) accord-
ing to which the functional specialisation of urban systems is intended as the outcome of
coordinated spatial organisation decisions of firms producing final goods. In the original
model firms could only decide whether remaining integrated or splitting up into head-
quarters and production plants, where the latter option necessarily implied locating the
two facilities in di↵erent cities. According to their framework, the decision was in fact
predominantly lead by the level of the communication cost between the two facilities, i.e.
the cost of managing production plants at distance. The novel part of my model consists
in the introduction of an additional dimension to the firm’s spatial problem. In my model
firms may also decide whether locating their headquarters in the business service center
with business sector or in a di↵erent city where they can release some congestion costs
at the expense of an additional communication cost. The latter must be intended as a
transaction cost or, equivalently, as an higher price for advanced business services. This
enriched framework allows me to investigate the e↵ects of the interplay between both types
of communication costs dynamics on the urban structure.
I find that the spatial equilibrium characterised by maximum functional specialisa-
tion and by the emergence of secondary business centers is not feasible for a large set of
parameters’ values. In most of the cases, in fact, the economy is likely to shift from an
integrated spatial organisation where all the cities host all the functions to a partially
specialised one which alternatively encompasses cities hosting integrated firms and cities
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hosting advanced business services providers or cities hosting production plants and cities
hosting headquarters and advanced business services providers.
Moreover, numerical simulations have shown that maximum functional specialisation
turns out to be feasible only for those economies which are characterised by the presence
of final good firms with a relatively small share of their cost function represented by
production plants. This suggests, as expected, that only service oriented economies are
worth of reaching the highest level of functional specialisation.
Another remarkable result is that, even when feasible, maximum functional special-
isation can be reached only if economy is already partially specialised, that is, already
encompassing for primary business centers. This happens if the communication costs with
the advanced business services providers are su ciently low, while firms have not enough
incentives to separate managers from production plants. On the contrary, the alternative
partially specialised spatial equilibrium encompassing for small manufacturing cities and
cities hosting business service providers and headquarters is a stable one in the sense that,
once reached, no further decrease in communication costs can make the economy shift to
an higher degree of functional specialisation. This could be the case of an economy mainly
characterised by multinational firms with managing separated from production and head-
quarters located in global cities. In this case, the model predicts no su cient incentives
for these firms to proceed in further spatial diversification by moving headquarters away
from that business centers.
Finally, when perfect functional specialisation is feasible the model also predicts a non-
linear substitution e↵ect between communication costs: when the extra cost associated
to buying advanced business services at distance is su ciently low, the spatial separation
between firms’ headquarters and production plants is more likely to occur. The extent
of localisation economies for business services and intermediate producers only a↵ects the
magnitude of the degree of substitutability between communication costs.
Notwithstanding the fact that this paper does not include any welfare analysis, it is worth-
while to stress that these results can be very important from a policy point of view, in that
policies aiming at supporting the emergence of “regional urban systems” characterised by
an high degree of functional specialisation have to take into account the level of both
communication costs and the non-linear e↵ects associated with their dynamics.
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1.A Break even conditions
(i) HQs and PPs of a firm integrated in the PBC;
xhi,i,i[P
h   (Hhi,i,i)⌘(Qm+hi )1 ⌘] = 0, P h   (Hhi,i,i)⌘(Qm+hi )1 ⌘  0,
xhi,i,i   0 (A.1)
(ii) HQs and PPs of a firm integrated outside the PBC (establishment integrated in a
SBD); ✓ˆ
z 6=i
xhi,i,zdz
◆
[P h   (K ·Hhi,i,i)⌘(Qm+hi )1 ⌘] = 0,
P h   (K ·Hhi,i,i)⌘(Qm+hi )1 ⌘  0,
ˆ
z 6=i
xhi,i,zdz   0 (A.2)
(iii) HQs of a multi-location firm, located in the PBC;✓ˆ
j 6=i
xhi,j,idj
◆
[P h   (⇢ ·Hhi,i,i)⌘(Qm+h)1 ⌘] = 0,
P h   (⇢ ·Hhi,i,i)⌘(Qm+h)1 ⌘  0,
ˆ
j 6=i
xhi,j,idj   0 (A.3)
(iv) HQs of a multi-location firm, located outside the PBC;✓ˆ
z 6=i
ˆ
j 6=i
xhi,j,zdjdz
◆
[P h   (K⇢ ·Hhi,i,i)⌘(Qm+h)1 ⌘] = 0,
P h   (K⇢ ·Hhi,i,i)⌘(Qm+h)1 ⌘  0,
ˆ
z 6=i
ˆ
j 6=i
xhi,j,zdjdz   0 (A.4)
(v) PPs of a multi-location firm, with HQs located in the PBC;✓ˆ
j 6=i
xhi,j,idj
◆
[P h   (⇢ ·Hh)⌘(Qm+hj )1 ⌘] = 0,
P h   (⇢ ·Hh)⌘(Qm+hj )1 ⌘  0,
ˆ
xhi,j,idj   0 (A.5)
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(vi) PPs of a multi-location firm, with HQs located outside the PBC;✓ˆ
z 6=i
ˆ
j 6=i
xhi,j,zdjdz
◆
[P h   (K⇢ ·Hh)⌘(Qm+hj )1 ⌘] = 0,
P h   (K⇢ ·Hh)⌘(Qm+hi )1 ⌘  0,
ˆ
z 6=i
ˆ
j 6=i
xhi,j,zdjdz   0 (A.6)
where integrals
´
z 6=i
´
j 6=i x
h
i,j,zdjdz,
´
j 6=i x
h
i,j,idj ,
´
z 6=i x
h
i,i,zdj aggregate respectively the out-
put of multi-location firms, of multi-location firms with headquarters located in the PBC
and of integrated firms located outside the PBC; K⇢Hh, KHh, ⇢Hh and Qm+h repre-
sent respectively lowest sub-cost functions for stand-alone HQ, for HQ located outside the
PBC, for stand-alone HQ located in the PBC and for stand-alone production plants.
1.B Land developer’s maximisation problem
In the following I derive an equivalente definition of the developer’s problem of (1.18). By
Shepard’s Lemma:
lhi =
@Chi,i,i
@whi
lhi =⌘µ(w
h
i )
⌘µ 1(w0i )
⌘(1 µ)(wm+hi )
1 ⌘(l0i )
 ⌘ (lm+hi )
 ✏(1 ⌘)
)(l0i ) ⌘ (lm+hi ) ✏(1 ⌘) =
(lhi )(w
h
i )
1 ⌘µ(w0i )⌘(µ 1)(w
m+h
i )
⌘ 1
⌘µ
; (B.1)
l0i =
@Chi,i,i
@w0i
l0i =⌘(1  µ)(whi )⌘µ(w0i )⌘(1 µ) 1(wm+hi )1 ⌘(l0i ) ⌘ (lm+hi ) ✏(1 ⌘)
)(l0i ) ⌘ (lm+hi ) ✏(1 ⌘) =
(l0i )(w
h
i )
 ⌘µ(w0i )1 ⌘(1 µ)(w
m+h
i )
⌘ 1
⌘(1  µ) ; (B.2)
lm+hi =
@Chi,i,i
@wm+hi
lm+hi =⌘ (w
h
i )
⌘µ(w0i )
⌘(1 µ)(wm+hi )
1 ⌘(l0i )
 ⌘ (lm+hi )
 ✏(1 ⌘)
)(l0i ) ⌘ (lm+hi ) ✏(1 ⌘) =
(lm+hi )(w
h
i )
 ⌘µ(w0i )⌘(µ 1)(w
m+h
i )
⌘
1  ⌘ ; (B.3)
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then, from (B.1) and (B.2), it follows that
whi l
h
i =
µ
1  µw
0
i l
0
i , (B.4)
while, from (B.2) and (B.3)
w0i l
0
i =
⌘(1  µ)
1  ⌘ w
m+h
i l
m+h
i , (B.5)
and, then, 8<:whi lhi =
µ
1 µw
0
i l
0
i
wm+hi l
m+h
i =
1 ⌘
⌘(1 µ)w
0
i l
0
i .
(B.6)
By (1.13) we have
whi = (w
0
i )
 (1 µ)/µ
h
Hhi,i,i(l
0
i )
 
i1/µ
; (B.7)
now, from (B.7) and, given that whi l
h
i =
Pm
h=1w
h
i l
h
i ,8<:w
0
i l
0
i = (
Pm
h=1w
h
i l
h
i )
1 µ
µ
whi = (w
0
i )
 (1 µ)/µ
h
Hhi,i,i(l
0
i )
 
i1/µ . (B.8)
We can now manipulate the first equation in (B.8)24 to obtain the total wage bill accruing
to 0-type workers as a function of l0i and l
h
i :
w0i l
0
i =
(w0i )
 (1 µ)/µ(l0i ) /µ[
Pm
h=1(H
h
i,i,i)
1/µlhi ]
µ/(1  µ)
) (w0i l0i )µ = [(1  µ)/µ]µ(w0i )(µ 1)(l0i ) 
"
mX
h=1
(Hhi,i,i)
1/µlhi
#µ
) w0i (l0i )µ = [(1  µ)/µ]µ(l0i ) 
"
mX
h=1
(Hhi,i,i)
1/µlhi
#µ
) w0i (l0i )µ(l0i )1 µ = [(1  µ)/µ]µ(l0i ) (l0i )1 µ
"
mX
h=1
(Hhi,i,i)
1/µlhi
#µ
) w0i l0i = [µ/1  µ] µ (l0i )1+  µHi,i
 
mX
h=1
lhi
!µ
| {z }
 
. (B.9)
then, substituting (B.4) 25into (B.9), and remembering that
m+1X
h=0
whi l
h
i =
 
mX
h=1
whi l
h
i
!
+ w0i l
0
i ,
24Note that the last step is allowed since profit maximisation by LD requires Hhi,i,i = Hi,i for all h such
that lhi   0.
25Note that
Pm
h=1 w
h
i l
h
i = w
h
i l
h
i .
29
1. Urban Functional Specialization and the Interplay between Firm’s
Communication Costs.
we get
mX
h=0
whi l
h
i = µ
 µ(1  µ) (1 µ) . (B.10)
We can now define the maximisation problem of this component, that is, the LD’s pro-
gramme for given
Pm
h=0 l
h
i writes as:
max
{l0i ,lhi }
mX
h=0
whi l
h
i = µ
 µ(1  µ) (1 µ)(l0i )1+  µHi,i
 
mX
h=1
lhi
!µ
, (B.11)
s.t
mX
h=0
lhi = Z.
where Z is a constant. Note that Z =
 Pm
h=1 l
h
i
 
+ l0i )
Pm
h=1 l
h
i = Z   l0i . Define now:
  = µ µ(1  µ) (1 µ)Hi,i; then, using
Pm
h=1 l
h
i = Z   l0i and taking the µ-root, the
maximand becomes:
 
1
µZ(l0i )
1+  µ
µ    1µ (l0i )
1+ 
µ . (B.12)
by manipulating the first derivative w.r.t. l0i we get the following relation between the
i-city HQ and ABS specific workforces:
@
Pm
h=0w
h
i l
h
i
@l0i
= 0)
mX
h=1
lhi =
µ
(1 + ✓)(1  µ) l
0
i =
µ
1 +     µl
0
i . (B.13)
Then, by substituting (B.13) in the maximand (B.11), we get
mX
h=0
whi l
h
i =
(1 + ✓) µ
1  µ Hi,i(l
0
i )
1+✓(1 µ);
and, from (1.13)
mX
h=1
wm+hi l
m+h
i =
mX
h=1
Qm+hi (l
m+h
i )
1+✏.
We can now substitute the latter two summations into the developer programme of (1.18)
⇧i =
mX
h=0
whi l
h
i +Q
m+h
i (l
m+h
i )
1+✏   Lie¯,
so that the LD’s objective function writes as
max
{l0i ,lhi ,lm+hi }
⇧i, ⇧i =
(1 + ✓) µ
1  µ Hi,i(l
0
i )
1+✓(1 µ) +Qm+hi,i (l
m+h
i )
1+✏   Lie¯. (B.14)
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1.C City sizes (Proof of Lemma 2)
The proof of Lemma w.r.t. to cases (a), (c), and (d) traces back to Duranton and Puga
(2004) and Duranton and Puga (2005).
1.C.1 Case (b)
Consider a city hosting only headquarters of multi-location firms,the equilibrium unit
production cost for firms in sector h is:
chb = (⇢ ·K)⌘(whb )⌘µ(w0b )⌘(1 µ)(wm+hb )1 ⌘(l0b ) ⌘ (lm+hb ) ✏(1 ⌘) (C.1)
By Shepard’s Lemma:
w0b =
(1  µ)whb lhb
µl0b
(C.2)
Substituting (C.2) into (C.1) yields:
chb = (⇢ ·K)⌘[wm+hb (lm+hb ) ✏](1 ⌘)(whb )⌘
✓
1  µ
µ
◆⌘(1 µ)
(l0b )
 ⌘(1 µ+ )(lhb )
⌘(1 µ) (C.3)
then, given that chb = P
h:
2mX
h=0
whb l
h
b = w
h
b l
h
b =
(
P h(µ)⌘(1 µ)(l0b )
⌘(1 µ+ )(lhb )
⌘µ
(⇢ ·K)⌘[wm+hb (lm+hb ) ✏](1 ⌘)(whb )⌘(1  µ)⌘(1 µ)
)1/⌘
(C.4)
and,
lhb = L
h
b (1  ⌧Lhb ) (C.5)
so as:
Maxlhb ,l
m+h
b
⇧b, ⇧b =
(
P h(µ)⌘(1 µ)(l0b )
⌘(1 µ+ )(lhb )
⌘µ
(⇢ ·K)⌘[wm+hb (lm+hb ) ✏](1 ⌘)(whb )⌘(1  µ)⌘(1 µ)
)1/⌘
  Lhb e¯
(C.6)
subject to (C.5), is the equivalent developer’s programme of (1.18). First order conditions
for (C.6) together with (C.5) and ⇧hb = 0 yield equilibrium population for any city hosting
only headquarters as:
Lb =
1 + µ
⌧(1 + 2µ)
(C.7)
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1.C.2 Case (e)
Consider a city hosting only integrated firms and intermediates suppliers,the equilibrium
unit production cost for firms in sector h is:
che = K
⌘(whe )
⌘µ(w0e)
⌘(1 µ)(wm+he )
1 ⌘(l0e)
 ⌘ (lm+he )
 ✏(1 ⌘) (C.8)
By Shepard’s Lemma26:
w0e l
0
e =
1  µ
µ
whe l
h
e =
⌘(1  µ)
1  ⌘ w
m+h
e l
m+h
e (C.9)
By Shepard’s Lemma and (B.13):
w0e =
whe
1 + ✓
, whe =
⌘µ
1  ⌘
wm+he l
m+h
e
lhe
(C.10)
Substituting (C.10) into (C.8) yields:
che = w
m+h
e l
m+h
e K
⌘ (1 + ✓) ⌘(1 µ) (l0e)
 ⌘ (lhe )
 ⌘)(lm+he )
( ✏(1 ⌘) 1 (C.11)
then, given that che = P
h:
2mX
h=0
whe l
h
e = w
h
e l
h
e + w
m+h
e l
m+h
e =
 µ
(1  ⌘)w
m+h
e l
m+h
e =
=
(1  ⌘)P h(l0e)⌘ (lhe )⌘(lm+he )1+✏(1 ⌘)
 µKn (1 + ✓)⌘(1 µ) (C.12)
and,
lhe + l
m+h
e = L
h
e (1  ⌧Lhe ) (C.13)
so as:
Maxlhe ⇧e, ⇧e =
(1  ⌘)P h(l0e)⌘ (lhe )⌘(lm+he )1+✏(1 ⌘)
 µKn (1 + ✓)⌘(1 µ)   L
h
e e¯ (C.14)
subject to (C.13), is the equivalent developer’s programme of (1.18). First order conditions
for (C.14) together with (C.13) and ⇧he = 0 yield equilibrium population for any city
hosting only headquarters as:
Le =
✏(1  ⌘)
⌧ [1 + 2✏(1  ⌘)] (C.15)
Total population then splits between occupations as:
lhe =
⌘
1 + ✏(1  ⌘)L
h
e (1  ⌧Le) (C.16)
lm+he =
(1 + ✏)(1  ⌘)
1 + ✏(1  ⌘) L
h
e (1  ⌧Le) (C.17)
26See (B.6).
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1.C.3 Case (f)
Consider a city hosting only business service providers,the equilibrium unit production
cost for a multi-location (or integrated 27) firm in sector h buying business services from
that city is:
chf = (⇢ ·K)⌘(whf )⌘µ(w0f )⌘(1 µ)(wm+hf )1 ⌘(l0f ) ⌘ (lm+hf ) ✏(1 ⌘) (C.18)
From (B.6):
whf =
µw0f l
0
f
(1  µ)lhf
(C.19)
Substituting (C.19) into (C.18) yields:
chf = (⇢ ·K)⌘(w0f )(1 µ)⌘(l0f ) ⌘ (wm+hf )1 ⌘(lm+hf ) ✏(1 ⌘)(whf )µ⌘ (C.20)
then, given that chf = P
h:
2mX
h=0
whf l
h
f = w
0
f l
0
f =
(
P h(l0f )
⌘(1 µ+ )(lm+hf )
✏(1 ⌘)
(⇢ ·K)⌘(whf )µ⌘(wm+hf )1 ⌘
)1/⌘(1 µ)
(C.21)
and,
l0f = L
h
f (1  ⌧Lhf ) (C.22)
so as:
Maxl0f ⇧f , ⇧f =
(
P h(l0f )
⌘(1 µ+ )(lm+hf )
✏(1 ⌘)
(⇢ ·K)⌘(whf )µ⌘(wm+hf )1 ⌘
)1/⌘(1 µ)
  Lhf e¯ (C.23)
subject to (C.22), is the equivalent developer’s programme of (1.18). First order conditions
for (C.23) together with (C.22) and ⇧hf = 0 yield equilibrium population for any city
hosting only headquarters as:
Lf =
 
⌧ [1  µ+ 2 ] (C.24)
1.D Thresholds (Proof of Proposition 1)
1.D.1 From spatial configuration 1 to 2
The equilibrium unit production cost for multi-location firms with headquarters co-located
with business service providers is:
cha = (⇢)
⌘(wha)
⌘µ(w0a)
⌘(1 µ)(wm+hc )
1 ⌘(l0a)
 ⌘ (lm+hc )
 ✏(1 ⌘) (D.1)
27In this case (⇢ · K)⌘ should be replaced by K⌘, yelding the same results.
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Dividing this by the unit production cost for fully integrated firms yields:
cha
chd
=
✓
⇢
⇢ˆ
◆⌘
(D.2)
where:
⇢ˆ =
24✓whd
wha
◆⌘µ✓
w0d
w0a
◆⌘(1 µ) wm+hd
wm+hc
!1 ⌘ ✓
l0d
l0a
◆ ⌘   lm+hd
lm+hc
! ✏(1 ⌘)35 1⌘ (D.3)
By Shepard’s Lemma and (B.13):
wha
w0a
= 1 + ✓;
wm+ha
w0a
=
(1  ⌘)l0a
⌘(1  µ)lm+ha
; (D.4)
The developer programme of (1.18), together with the exhaustion of developers’ profits
due to free entry imply:
1
⌘(1  µ)w
0
dl
0
d = Lde¯;
1
1  µw
0
al
0
a = Lae¯; w
m+h
c l
m+h
c = Lce¯ (D.5)
From (D.4) and (D.5),
whd
wha
=
w0d
w0a
=
⌘Ldl0a
Lal0d
;
wm+hd
wm+hc
=
(1  ⌘)Ldlm+hc
Lcl
m+h
d
(D.6)
Then, from
P2m
h=0 l
h
i = Li(1  ⌧Li) and (B.13):
l0a =
1 +     µ
1 +  
Lha(1  ⌧Lha) (D.7)
lm+hc = Lc(1  ⌧Lc) (D.8)
while, from Lemma 2,
l0d =
⌘(1 +     µ)
1 +  
Lhd(1  ⌧Lhd) (D.9)
lm+hd =
(1  ⌘)(1 + ✏)
1 +  
Lhd(1  ⌧Lhd) (D.10)
Substituting (D.6), (D.7), (D.8), (D.9), (D.10) and Lemma 2 into (D.3) and simplifying
yields the value of ⇢ˆ given in the proposition. When ⇢ < ⇢ˆ,and if no other functional
specialisation trend is present, total mass of cities split between cities of type (a) and type
(c). We denote by Na the mass of cities that host headquarters of multi-location firms
plus advanced business services and by Nc the mass of cities that host production plants
of multi-location firms. By Shepard’s Lemma,
w0al
0
aNa
wm+hc l
m+h
c Nc
=
⌘(1  µ)
1  ⌘
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Combining this with (D.6) yields the share of cities hosting only headquarters of multi-
location firms plus advanced business services when ⇢ < ⇢ˆ as
⌘✏(1 + 2 )
⌘✏(1 + 2 ) + (1  ⌘) (1 + 2✏)
Remaining cities specialise in production and, by symmetry, there are equal proportions
of cities specialised in each of the m sectors.
1.D.2 From spatial configuration 1 to 3
The equilibrium unit production cost for integrated firms buying business services from
abroad is:
che = (K)
⌘(whe )
⌘µ(w0f )
⌘(1 µ)(wm+he )
1 ⌘(l0f )
 ⌘ (lm+he )
 ✏(1 ⌘) (D.11)
Dividing this by the unit production cost for fully integrated firms yields:
che
chd
=
✓
K
Kˆ
◆⌘
(D.12)
where:
Kˆ =
24✓whd
whe
◆⌘µ 
w0d
w0f
!⌘(1 µ) 
wm+hd
wm+he
!1 ⌘  
l0d
l0f
! ⌘   
lm+hd
lm+he
! ✏(1 ⌘)35 1⌘ (D.13)
By Shepard’s Lemma,
w0d
whd
=
1  µ
µ
lhd
l0d
(D.14)
The developer programme of (1.18), together with the exhaustion of developers’ profits
due to free entry imply:
whd l
h
d = ⌘µLde¯; w
0
f l
0
f = Lf e¯; w
m+h
e l
m+h
e =
1  ⌘
1  ⌘ + µ⌘Lee¯;
wm+hd l
m+h
d = (1  ⌘)Lde¯; whe lhe =
µ⌘
1  ⌘ + µ⌘Lee¯; w
0
dl
0
d = ⌘(1  µ)Lde¯ (D.15)
From (D.14) and (D.15),
whd
whe
=
[1  ⌘(1  µ)]Ldlhe
Lelhd
;
wm+hd
wm+he
=
[1  ⌘(1  µ)]Ldlm+he
Lel
m+h
d
;
w0d
w0f
=
⌘(1  µ)Ld(1  ⌧Lf )
l0d
(D.16)
Then, from
P2m
h=0 l
h
i = Li(1  ⌧Li) and (B.13):
l0f = Lf (1  ⌧Lf ) (D.17)
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Substituting (D.9), (D.10),(D.16), (D.17) and Lemma 2 into (D.13) and simplifying yields
the value of Kˆ given in the proposition. When K < Kˆ,and if no other functional spe-
cialisation trend is present, total mass of cities split between cities of type (e) and type
(f).
1.D.3 From spatial configuration 3 to 4
The equilibrium unit production cost for firms adopting multi-location of (1.17) is:
chb = (⇢ ·K)⌘(whb )⌘µ(w0f )⌘(1 µ)(wm+hc )1 ⌘(l0f ) ⌘ (lm+hc ) ✏(1 ⌘) (D.18)
Dividing this by the unit production cost for partially integrated ex-CD firms yields:
chb
che
=
✓
⇢
⇢¯
◆⌘
(D.19)
where:
⇢¯ =
"✓
whe
whb
◆⌘µ✓
wm+he
wm+hc
◆1 ⌘ ✓
lm+he
lm+hc
◆ ✏(1 ⌘)# 1⌘
(D.20)
By Shepard’s Lemma we have that whe l
h
e =
µ⌘
1 ⌘w
m+h
e l
m+h
e and,
whe
wm+he
=
µ⌘
1  ⌘
lm+he
lhe
(D.21)
The developer programme of (1.18), together with the exhaustion of developers’ profits
due to free entry, implies:
whb l
h
b = Lbe¯; w
m+h
c l
m+h
c = Lce¯; w
m+h
e l
m+h
e =
1  ⌘
1  ⌘ + µ⌘Lee¯ (D.22)
From (D.21), (D.22),
whe =
µ⌘
1  ⌘ + µ⌘
Lee¯
lhe
(D.23)
From (D.21), (D.22), (D.23),
whe
whb
=
µ⌘
1  ⌘ + µ⌘
Le(1  ⌧Lb)
lhe
;
wm+he
wm+hc
=
1  ⌘
1  ⌘ + µ⌘
Le(1  ⌧Lc)
lm+he
; (D.24)
Substituting (C.17), (D.8) and Lemma 2 into (D.20) and simplifying yields the value of ⇢¯
given in the proposition. When ⇢ < ⇢¯, total mass of cities split between cities of type (b),
type (f) and type (c).
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1.D.4 From spatial configuration 2 to 4
Dividing the equilibrium unit production cost of (D.18) by the equilibrium unit production
cost for firms adopting multi-location organisational form of (1.16) yields:
chb
cha
=
✓
K
K¯
◆⌘
(D.25)
where:
K¯ =
24✓wha
whb
◆⌘µ 
w0a
w0f
!⌘(1 µ) 
l0a
l0f
! ⌘ 35 1⌘ (D.26)
The developer programme of (1.18), together with the exhaustion of developers’ profits
due to free entry imply:
w0al
0
a = (1  µ)Lae¯; wha lha = µLae¯; whb lhb = Lbe¯; whf lfb = Lf e¯ (D.27)
From (D.27),
wha
whb
= µ
La(1  ⌧Lb)
lha
;
w0a
w0f
= (1  µ)La(1  ⌧Lf )
l0a
(D.28)
Again, from
P2m
h=0 l
h
i = Li(1  ⌧Li) and Lemma 2,
lha =
µ
1 +  
Lha(1  ⌧Lha) (D.29)
Substituting (D.7), (D.17), (D.29) and Lemma 2 into (D.25) and simplifying yields the
value of K¯ given in the proposition. When K < K¯, total mass of cities split between cities
of type (b), type (f) and type (c).
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2. Trade Liberalisation between Asymmetric Countries with
Environmentally Concerned Consumers
2.1 Introduction
In the last two decades, economists have massively contributed to the discussion on the
environmental e↵ects of trade liberalisation and the e↵ects of countries’ environmental
conditions on their competitivity. This task has been carried out taking into considera-
tion di↵erent industrial configurations, either Bertrand or Cournot competition as well as
di↵erent definitions of the environmental damage.
What we propose here is an additional contribution that formally tackles the problem
relying on a spatial framework a` la Hotelling, were two firms produce an horizontally
di↵erentiated good. The comparatively small theoretical literature existing in this area (see
Lambertini (1997a); and Tharakan and Thisse (2002)) has indeed pointed out the presence
of interesting asymmetric e↵ects on welfare, arising in that specific, partial equilibrium
framework. In the spatial framework, in fact - if transport costs are quadratic in distance
- the smaller country has been shown to undoubtedly benefit from free trade by increasing
its own firm’s sales: its firm’s profits increase at the expenses of the consumer surplus of
the larger country. This also implies that trade liberalisation, although improving welfare
at the world level, necessarily has a negative impact on the welfare of the larger among
the two countries: if firms can preserve market power via endogenous di↵erentiation,
the geographical size matters and trade liberalisation asymmetric e↵ects on welfare are
mainly driven by profits dynamics. Our intention is to verify whether taking environmental
issues into account may modify this conclusion in favour of a positive symmetric e↵ect
of trade liberalisation which, obviously, is a necessary condition for free trade to emerge
spontaneously at equilibrium. In our model, asymmetry in size and horizontal product
di↵erentiation combine with a few additional features: (i) consumers in larger of the
two countries are environmentally concerned, while their fellow consumers abroad are
not; as a result, (ii) the firm based in the environmentally aware market is green from
the outset, while her equivalent based abroad is brown; and (iii) pollution is taken to
be a consequence of consumption, so that it is not transboundary under autarky, while
any penetration of the environmentally aware country on the part of the brown firm
causes environmentally concerned consumers to experience some degree of environmental
externality, increasing in the volume of imports. To this regard, a few aspects require some
clarification. First, since in the real world larger countries are generally net exporters
of polluting products, in our model, country size is to be intended as the number of
consumers with a su ciently high disposable income which are then supposed to share
a similar consumption pattern with analogous consumers worldwide. This allows us to
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say that large emerging countries (China, India and Brazil) are, de facto, small relative to
developed countries such that those of Western Europe. Second, the fact that in our model
the smaller (poorer) country’s firm is the one producing a brown good may be justified by
resorting to the so-called pollution haven hypothesis : poorer countries have a comparative
advantage in the production of brown goods, given their laxer pollution policies.1
Finally, even if the model encompasses exclusively the special case of contiguous coun-
tries, it is perfectly able to account for trade liberalisation e↵ects in the case of geographi-
cally distant countries, provided that the negative externality is generated by consumption
rather than by production. Our model is therefore suitable for approaching some policy
issues: may consumers’ environmental awareness, per se, change the distribution of gain
and losses stemming from trade liberalisation by limiting the demand of the brown good?
Must a tari↵/subsidy policy intervene to correct or eliminate altogether this externality?
We find that the large country can gain from trade liberalisation only if a reversal of the
pattern of trade is feasible, that is, if the smaller country is not so small. In that case, in
fact, the former can always adopt a subsidy policy to induce the trade reversal and this,
in addition to setting the home emission level to zero, reduces its level abroad.
Our work draws on three strands of the theoretical literature: the first on spatial
competition a` la Hotelling, the second on the environmental e↵ects of international trade
(in the presence of a trade policy) and the third on the environmental e↵ects of consumers’
environmental awareness. Suitable background for the first one is available in standard
references such as D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979), Lambertini (1997b) and
Tabuchi and Thisse (1995) as well as in Lambertini (1997a) and Tharakan and Thisse
(2002). The latter two works specifically focus on the e↵ects of international trade in a
Hotelling international duopoly and, since they both encompass asymmetry in the size of
countries, also represent the most appropriate comparative background for our model.2
The second strand of literature is particularly rich and contributions have proceeded in
several directions. We may refer the reader to works which merely or primarily attempt to
assess the links between trading regimes and environmental outcomes, these being defined
in terms of level/incidence of pollution3 or in terms of natural resources/environmental
1To this regard, see Copeland and Taylor (2004) for a review.
2The same question is posed in a similar framework by Shachmurove and Spiegel (1995), while Egger
and Egger (2007, 2010) analyze the consequences of free trade in a spatial model allowing for a change in
the industrial structure and in firms’ organization.
3See Copeland and Taylor (2003, 2004) for an exhaustive review of the literature. As an example,
the framework proposed by Copeland and Taylor (1994), is that of a static two-country model where
each country produces a continuum of goods di↵erentiated by the degree of greenness (here authors allow
the government to set pollution taxes); they find that income is positively correlated with the degree of
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capital depletion.4 Secondly, a larger part of this literature has essentially faced policy
issues, both in terms of environmental policies (price controls, emission tradable permits
and pollution quotas) and trade policies. To this regard, comprehensive assessments are
provided by Copeland and Taylor (2004) and Copeland (2011) referring both to what
concerns the e↵ects of trade liberalisation on environmental policy and the e↵ects of envi-
ronmental problems on trade policy.5 To this regard, issues of particular interest are the
use of trade policies to achieve environmental objectives and vice-versa, the adoption of
environmental policy in order to distort trade flows. Moreover, a few contributions has
focused on the relation between trade, transboundary pollution and climate change.6
Concerning the third strand of literature, despite the fact that our model includes a
very simple modelisation of environmental awareness, it is reminiscent of previous im-
portant contributions such as Conrad (2005), tackling the problem of the e↵ect of envi-
ronmental awareness on equilibrium prices, product characteristics and market shares of
two Hotelling-style firms. Again in a spatial framework, remarkable works are those of
Rodr´ıguez-Ibeas (2007) and Clemenz (2010), while Yakita and Yamauchi (2011) adopt a
Cournot oligopoly framework with horizontal product di↵erentiation. Papers by Eriks-
son (2004), Moraga-Gonza´lez and Padro´n-Fumero (2002) and Bansal and Gangopadhyay
(2003) are largely focus on the relation between the presence of environmentally concerned
consumers and the e cacy of environmental policies, while Espinola-Arredondo and Zhao
(2011) try to assess the welfare implications of subsidisation/taxation policies in a linear
environmental protection, while, in the presence of a su ciently unequal distribution of income at the world
level, free trade raises pollution. In a similar manner Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (2001) introduce
a pollution tax which is shown to influence the pattern of trade, coherently with the pollution haven
hypothesis: the higher the country’s income, the stricter the pollution policy, the higher the comparative
advantage in clean good. Finally, Fujiwara (2009) investigates the e↵ects of free trade on global stock of
pollution using a two-country di↵erential game model. Additional contributions are the works from Zeng
and Zhao (2009), Ederington, Levinson, and Minier (2004) and, in a purely empirical context, Frankel and
Rose (2005).
4Here, primary references are the papers from Brander and Taylor (1997) and Copeland and Taylor
(1999); the former concludes that trade may be welfare reducing for a small country net exporter of di-
versified resources since it enhances natural resources depletion, while the latter provides an explanation
for trade based on spatial separation of incompatible industries due to production-production negative
externalities in terms of reduction of environmental capital. Chichilnisky (1994) proposes an explanation
of international (North-South) trade based on the di↵erence in the definition of property rights on environ-
mental resources, in her framework, taxing the use of resources in the South leads to increasing extraction.
More Recent works are those of Taylor (2011) and Copeland and Taylor (2009). The former develops a
model in which open access together with natural resource’s fixed price and innovation can explain how
international trade can bring about a rapid decline in the environmental capital of a country while the
latter link the country’s choice of the resource exploitation regime to the dynamics of world prices.
5With respect to the this issue other remarkable references are the works by Neary (2006), Haupt
(2006), McAusland (2008) and Bagwell and Staiger (2001).
6To this regard see Copeland and Taylor (2005), Fischer and Fox (2009), Gros (2009), Keen and
Kotsogiannis (2011) and Holland (2009).
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city model very similar to ours, even if abstracting from the e↵ects of trade.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model,
the autarkic equilibrium and the the e↵ects of trade liberalisation. Section 3 shows how
di↵erent trade policies can a↵ect long run social welfare of both countries. Section 4
considers the opposite case in which the larger country is the one where the brown good
is produced. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 The model
We rely on the general framework of D’Aspremont, Gabszewicz, and Thisse (1979) as
modified by Lambertini (1997a) by introducing asymmetry in countries’ size. Two firms
operate in a linear world of unit length where firm 1 is necessarily located in country 1
and firm 2 in country 2. Consumers are uniformly distributed over [0, 1] with density
1 and that a share ↵ of them belongs to country 1 while the complement to 1 belongs
to country 2. Since ↵ is to be intended as the border, asymmetry in countries’ sizes is
ensured by limiting it in the interval (0, 1/2) so as country 1 is smaller than country 2. A
constant marginal cost of production is common to both firms7 and no relocation costs are
modelled. We extend the model by supposing existence of an additional asymmetry w.r.t.
the environmental impact of consumption, in such a way that consuming the product
supplied by firm 1 entails a negative externality, while the good supplied by firm 2 is
green. We may justify this assumption by supposing that consumers in country 2 have
developed an environmental awareness at some point in the past, while this does not apply
to consumers living in country 1. This has two consequences. The first is the presence of
a linear damage function such that country i’s social welfare is reduced by an amount Di
which is equal to:
Di =  y1i with i = 1, 2,
where y1i is country i’s total consumption of the brown good produced by firm 1 while
  represents the emission intensity. The second consequence is the representation of con-
sumer preferences in the two countries. In both, each consumer has a unit demand and
consumption yields a constant positive surplus s; net utility, however, will or will not
account for pollution, depending on the location of a specific consumer. Consider first an
individual based in country 1. For him/her, net utility is defined as:
U1 = s  td2i   pi, i = 1, 2, (2.1)
7Here assumed to be nil without loss of generality.
43
2. Trade Liberalisation between Asymmetric Countries with
Environmentally Concerned Consumers
where pi is the price of variety i and td2i is the transportation cost, quadratic in distance
di from firm i; the latter is defined as:
di = m  xi, (2.2)
where m and xi are, respectively, the generic consumer’s and firm’s i locations.
Looking instead at a consumer based in country 2, the corresponding net surplus is defined
as:
U2 = s  td2i   pi  D2, i = 1, 2, (2.3)
where D2 = 0 in autarky. For the sake of simplicity, and without further loss of generality,
we also normalize the transportation cost rate t to one.
2.2.1 Autarkic equilibrium
autarky, the monopoly price set by each firm nullifies the net surplus Ui of the marginal
consumers, i.e., those living at country borders 0, ↵ or 1:
pA1 = s  (↵  xA1 )2; pA2 = s  (1  xA2 )2, (2.4)
where xA1 = ↵/2 and x
A
2 = (↵+1)/2 are the socially optimal locations in autarky (denoted
by superscript A), minimizing total transportation costs in each country:
TCA1 =
ˆ ↵
0
(d1)
2dm; TCA2 =
ˆ 1
↵
(d2)
2dm. (2.5)
These of course also appears in the definition of consumer surpluses:
CSA1 =
ˆ ↵
0
[s  p1   (d1)2]dm; CSA2 =
ˆ 1
↵
[s  p2   (d2)2]dm. (2.6)
As for social welfare in country 1 and 2, respectively defined as:
SWA1 = ⇡
A
1 + CS
A
1    ↵; SWA2 = ⇡A2 + CSA2 ;
the autarky equilibrium yields:
SWA1 = ↵
✓
s  1
12
↵2    
◆
; SWA2 = (1  ↵)[s 
1
12
(1  ↵)2]. (2.7)
Note that while social welfare of country 1 is negatively a↵ected by consumption of the
brown good (yA11 = ↵), this does not a↵ect social welfare of country 2 (since the externality
is generated by consumption, no transboundary pollution is supposed to exist). Moreover,
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non negativity of both prices requires imposing a condition on the level of gross consumer
surplus common to all consumers, which is (see Appendix A.1):
s   sAp =
1
4
 
1  2↵+ ↵2  . (2.8)
The autarkic equilibrium definitions of other relevant magnitudes are reported in Appendix
A.
2.2.2 The free trade equilibrium
In this section we evaluate the consequences of trade liberalisation by allowing firms to
relocate and adjust prices in order to maximize profits. The only restriction we pose is
that firms cannot relocate outside the unit segment measuring the size of this two-country
economy.8 The first step consists in understanding whether the environmental externality
can a↵ect the equilibrium partition of demand under free trade, or not.
Lemma 1 [Demand partition and environmental awareness] The position of the indi↵er-
ent consumer is independent of emission intensity (or environmental awareness).
Proof. The indi↵erent consumer’s location mˆ (i.e., the identity of the consumer which
determining market shares) is identified by the following condition:
pT1 + (mˆ  xT1 )2 +  (mˆ  ↵) = pT2 + (mˆ  xT2 )2 +  (mˆ  ↵), (2.9)
where superscript T stands for free trade and the term  (mˆ   ↵) represents the value
of the damage function D2 when mˆ   ↵ consumers of country 2 buy from firm 1. This
condition is then defined only for mˆ > ↵ which implies the marginal consumer has to be
located in country 2.
Solving (2.9) for mˆ then yields:
mˆ =
pT1   pT2 + (xT1 )2   (xT2 )2
2(xT1   xT2 )
. (2.10)
Market demands are therefore defined as:
yT1 = mˆ =
8>>><>>>:
mˆ iff mˆ 2 (0, 1);
1 iff mˆ   1;
0 iff mˆ  0.
; yT2 = 1  mˆ =
8>>><>>>:
1  mˆ iff 1  mˆ 2 (0, 1);
1 iff 1  mˆ   1;
0 iff 1  mˆ  0.
.
(2.11)
8In this respect, the present approach di↵ers from what is typically accepted in other papers using
the same model (Tabuchi and Thisse (1995); Lambertini (1997b)). The reason is that here the single
spatial dimension necessarily accounts for both possible interpretations, as a geographical space and as the
preference space.
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That is, since consumers in country 2 incorporate the environmental externality irrespec-
tively of their consumption choice (whether green or brown), the volume of firm 1’s exports
to country 2 is altogether una↵ected by the environmental awareness of the recipients. As
a consequence, the two-stage subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies arising under
free trade coincides with Lambertini (1997a), with maximum di↵erentiation at xT1 = 0,
xT2 = 1 and equilibrium prices and profits p
L
1 = p
L
2 = t = 1; and ⇡
L
1 = ⇡
L
2 =
t
2 =
1
2 . And,
of course, mˆ = 12 .
No additional condition on s, ↵,   is thus required to ensure the non-negativity of prices
and profits while a new condition on gross surplus must hold in order for full market
coverage to be sustainable, i.e.,
s   sTMC =
1
4
[5 + 2 (1  2↵)], (2.12)
where
sTMC > s
A
p 8↵ 2]0, 1/2[,  2]0, 1[,
so as condition for market coverage in the long run also ensures non-negativity of prices
in autarky. Concerning price dynamics in the shift from autarky to free trade, we have
that pL1 < p
A
1 and p
L
2 < p
A
2 8↵ 2 (0, 1/2),  2 (0, 1). Remaining magnitudes are reported
in Appendix A.
2.2.3 Trade liberalisation e↵ects
The results described in the previous subsections allow us to analyze the e↵ects of trade
liberalisation in terms of changes in the relevant magnitudes. These are summarised in
the following
Proposition 1 [Welfare] Trade liberalisation causes (i) an increase in the welfare of the
smaller country if the latter is su ciently small; (ii) a decrease in the welfare of the larger
country; (iii) a decrease in the welfare at the world level.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Hence, since free trade is unambiguously detrimental for the larger country (regardless of
the degree of asymmetry in size and the emission intensity), trade opening is a strictly
dominated strategy for the latter. From this it follows that trade liberalisation is unlikely
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to occur, which is true even if allowing for side payments, since the gain in social welfare
for the smaller country is never high enough to compensate for the loss borne by the larger
one.
In order to understand why trade liberalisation has always a negative impact on the larger
country’s welfare as well as on the smaller country’s welfare in most of the cases, we now
proceed to decompose the e↵ects on social welfare into two separate elements, namely, the
consequences of trade on firms’ profits as well as on consumer surpluses. As to the latter
magnitude, the following holds:
Proposition 2 [Consumer Surplus] Trade liberalisation, by decreasing both prices, deter-
mines an increase in consumer surplus in both countries.
Proof. See Appendix A.
With free trade, instantaneous firms’ relocation in correspondence of the world economy’s
borders entails an increase in transportation costs for both countries. Thus, the positive
e↵ect on worldwide consumer surplus has to be necessarily determined by the decrease in
prices, due to the Bertrand competition arising in the international duopoly setting.
We now move to consider how trade liberalisation a↵ects profits in the long run.
Proposition 3 [Profits] Free trade brings about an increase in the profit accruing to the
firm based in the smaller country provided that the latter is su ciently small, while it
always hurts the firm based in the larger country.
Proof. As far as firm 2 is concerned, the statement contained in in Proposition 3 is
intuitive: since trade liberalisation entails diminishing demand, the negative quantity
e↵ect sums up to the negative price e↵ect and profits shrink, regardless of ↵ and  . As to
Firm 1 we have that:
⇡T1   ⇡A1 =
1
4
⇥
2  ↵  4s  ↵2 ⇤ > 0,
iff s < sT1 =
2 + ↵3
4↵
, (2.13)
where sT1 is strictly decreasing in ↵, with s
T
1 2]1, 1716 [ as ↵ 2]0, 12 [. Moreover s < sT1 is
necessary but not su cient condition for (2.13) to hold in equilibrium since also sT1 > s
T
MC ,
which ensures non-negativity of prices and full market coverage, has to be met. The latter
is verified for ↵ 2]0, 1 +p2 w 0.414[ and   2]0,min[2 5↵+↵32↵ 4↵2 , 1][.9
9This also implies that (2.13) holds, regardless of the level of  , for ↵ 2]0, 12 (
p
33  5) w 0.372[.
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Thus, as far as firm 1 is concerned, the gain in profits associated to trade liberalisation is
decreasing in ↵. An higher ↵, in fact, strengthens price competition and, moreover, reduces
the positive quantity e↵ect of trade liberalisation (12   ↵): since equilibrium location of
the marginal consumer is not a↵ected by the relative size of country 1, the gain in demand
accruing to firm 1 is decreasing in ↵.
Moreover, from (2.13), the gain in profits is decreasing in the individual consumer surplus s
too. This is due to the fact that a higher s, via an increase in the price of the brown variety,
raises profits autarkic equilibrium level, though leaving una↵ected the corresponding level
in free trade.10 This also formally explains the existence of a substitution e↵ect between
the asymmetry in size and the individual consumer surplus, that is, why threshold sT1 is
decreasing in ↵: when countries are very similar in size, the autarkic profits must be very
low to preserve the existence of a gain associated to trade liberalisation, since the latter
entails a lower quantity e↵ect .
Lastly, if country 1 is su ciently large (↵ > 0.372), we have identified an upper threshold
for the emission intensity (  = 2 5↵+↵32↵ 4↵2 ). If   >
2 5↵+↵3
2↵ 4↵2 , it follows that s
T
1 < s
T
MC that
is for all levels of s which ensure non-negativity of prices and full market coverage firm 1
cannot gain from free trade.
Hence, trade liberalisation has asymmetric e↵ects on firms’ profits: while it unambiguously
implies a loss for firm 2 it may favour firm 1. Since free trade brings about a decrease
in both equilibrium prices, this is necessarily due to the di↵erence in the sign of the
quantity e↵ect which is clearly negative for the larger country and positive for the smaller.
Propositions 1-3 have been summarised in Table 1.
Country
1 2
TC " "
CS " "
p # #
y " #
⇡ l #
SW l #
Table 2.1: Trade liberalisation, signs of magnitudes’ variations.
10Since, when duopolistic competition arises, exactly the same e↵ect is shown to be entirely transferred
to consumer surpluses (see Appendix (A.1) and (A.2) ).
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To conclude, the shift from autarkic to free trade equilibrium has not univocal im-
plications from the point of view of social welfare of country 1: until country 1 is small
enough (↵ < 0.4735), in fact, the gain in consumer surplus for its inhabitants outweighs
any loss in firm’s profits, regardless of the level of   and s; for higher ↵ the opposite is
true: the dynamic of profits is unambiguously negative and the gain in consumer surplus
is reduced. The intuition behind the latter e↵ect is straightforward: the price that firm
1 can sustain in autarky is decreasing in ↵ due to the fact that she must compensate for
higher transportation costs borne by consumers, while is constant in free trade; this sums
up with the fact that ↵ has a stronger positive e↵ect on the free trade equilibrium level
of transportation costs as compared to those of autarky.
For what concerns country 2, we conclude that, though welfare reducing, trade liberalisa-
tion acts in favour of a redistribution of welfare from the firm to the consumers: the price
e↵ect stemming from duopolisitic competition raises the consumer surplus, and, together
with an output reduction, implies a decrease in the profits accruing to the domestic firm.
2.3 Trade policy
We now proceed to analyze the long-run consequences of trade liberalisation when the
government of country 2, which is otherwise unambiguously su↵ering from the opening
of trade, implements a trade policy. To this end we define two policies: a linear tari↵
weighted by the emission intensity - which is indeed formally equivalent to a Pigouvian
tax on imports - and a subsidy for firm 2, where the latter is supposed to be financed by
an equivalent decrease in country 2’s social welfare.
2.3.1 Import Tari↵
We first suppose that country 2’s government levies a tari↵ ⌧ > 0 on the negative exter-
nality generated by the volume of the imported brown variety, so that the profits of firm
1 are lowered by an amount equal to:11
⌧ (mˆT ⌧   ↵).
We can then write:
⇡T ⌧1 = p
T ⌧
1 mˆT ⌧   ⌧ (mˆT ⌧   ↵), (3.1)
11Note that this formulation implies that the optimal tari↵ may e↵ectively result in a trade policy
instrument and not only in an environmental policy one since, in principle, its level may be either more or
less than compensate the value of the damage function D2.
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and
SW T ⌧2 = ⇡
T ⌧
2 + CS
T ⌧
2    (mˆT ⌧   ↵) + ⌧ (mˆT ⌧   ↵), (3.2)
where T ⌧ stands for trade with tari↵. In equilibrium, social welfare of country 2 is thus
supposed to be augmented by an amount equal to the gross tari↵ income; the definition
of all other magnitudes is unchanged w.r.t. the case described in section 3. Again, the
equilibrium arising is such that xT ⌧1 = 0 and x
T ⌧
2 = 1, implying the following marginal
consumer’s equilibrium location:
mˆT ⌧ =
1
6
(3   ⌧); (3.3)
while equilibrium prices are pT ⌧1 = 1 +
2 ⌧
3 ; p
T ⌧
2 = 1 +
 ⌧
3 . From the condition of non
negativity of country 2’s imports (mˆT ⌧   ↵ > 0) we can derive the maximum admissible
level of the tari↵ ⌧ :
⌧¯ =
3  6↵
 
. (3.4)
For each ⌧ > ⌧¯ , the model thus predicts a reversal of trade flows with mˆT ⌧ < ↵; this
would formally translate the tari↵ into a subsidy for firm 1, which, clearly, is not among
the feasible policies available to country 2’s government, and would invalidate the definition
of the demand system. Full market coverage is now ensured if consumers’ gross surplus is
greater than:
sT ⌧MC =
1
36
 
45 + 18    36↵  + 18 ⌧   6 2⌧ +  2⌧2  , (3.5)
where, again, sT ⌧MC > s
A
p 8↵ 2]0, 1/2[,   2]0, 1[, ⌧ > 0; while the non negativity of both
prices is always verified.
The objective function of the government of country 2 is then:
max
⌧
SW T ⌧2 s.t. ⌧ < ⌧¯ , (3.6)
which yields:
⌧⇤ =
2  2↵+  
 
8 ↵ 2]0, 1
4
[,   2]0, 1  4↵[.
Note that optimal tari↵ ⌧⇤ is decreasing in both   and ↵. For ⌧ = ⌧⇤ the marginal
consumer locates at:
mˆ⇤T ⌧ =
1 + 2↵   
6
. (3.7)
Thus, for   2]1  4↵, 1[, country 2’s government cannot implement ⌧⇤ since ⌧⇤ > ⌧¯ , it will
then necessarily choose a sub-optimal tari↵ ⌧ = ⌧¯ in order to maximize social welfare.12
12Note that, ↵ 2] 14 , 12 [ is su cient but not necessary condition for ⌧⇤ > ⌧¯ .
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Indeed, for all 0 < ⌧ < ⌧⇤:
@SW T ⌧2
@⌧
=
1
12
⇥
2 (2  2↵+  )  2 2⌧⇤ > 0 8 ↵ 2]0, 1
4
[,   2]1  4↵, 1[.
The reason for optimal tari↵ never restoring autarky for   < 1   4↵, is that, in corre-
spondence of ⌧ = ⌧⇤ < ⌧¯ , a higher tari↵ would imply, via higher prices, a reduction in
consumers’ surplus of country 2 strictly greater than the gain in firm 2 profits and in gross
tari↵ revenues. For very low ↵ and   a full import substitution obtained through a tari↵
is thus not feasible, implying a too high cost to be borne by consumers. Equilibrium def-
initions of magnitudes relatives to both ⌧ = ⌧⇤ and ⌧ = ⌧¯ cases are reported in Appendix
B.
If the government of country 2 levies the optimal tari↵ ⌧ = ⌧⇤, we can state what follows:
Proposition 4 [Tari↵] There exists no import tari↵ whereby the larger country’s welfare
exceeds its autarkic level.
Proof. In order to prove the proposition it is su cient to observe that:
SW T ⌧2   SWA2 =
1
12
⇥
↵+ 7↵2 + 3↵3 + 8↵  + (    2)    2⇤ ; (3.8)
is strictly negative over the admissible range of parameters ↵ and  .
Hence, for what concerns country 2, an optimal tari↵ is never e↵ective in determining an
increase in social welfare of the same country as compared to the autarkic equilibrium.
The reason basically lies in the fact that the tari↵ itself does not su ce to raise free
trade profits over the autarkic equilibrium level. An optimal tari↵, in fact, never restores
autarky, and then, always implies a negative quantity e↵ect for firm 2 sales, associated
with trade liberalisation.13
What stated so far, obviously holds even in the case a suboptimal tari↵ ⌧ = ⌧¯ is levied,
for ↵ 2]0, 12 [ and   2]max[1   4↵, 0], 1[. As for country 1, see Appendix B for a detailed
assessment of the e↵ects of trade liberalisation in the presence of an optimal tari↵ ⌧⇤.
13Notwithstanding this, with a tari↵, a smaller part of consumers living in country 2 switches to firm
1, and price competition is undoubtedly relaxed. This implies that trade liberalisation necessarily reduces
profits of firm 2 by a lesser amount as compared to the case in which no tari↵ is levied. On the consumers’
side, the decrease in surplus due to higher prices is partially compensated by the gross tari↵ revenues.
Since the positive e↵ect exerted by the tari↵ on profits is not fully compensated by the corresponding
negative e↵ect on consumer surplus, we can state that, with regards to the larger country, the tari↵ acts
in limiting the negative e↵ect of trade liberalisation on the social welfare.
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2.3.2 Subsidisation and trade reversal
In the last subsection we have identified the parametric range in which an optimal tari↵
can be levied by the government of country 2. We have also stated that, outside this
range, if the government wants to impose an import tari↵, it must choose a sub-optimal
level of the latter, that is the one restoring autarky, ⌧ = ⌧¯ . As an alternative to this, the
government may undertake an export subsidy policy. The latter is obviously defined only
for mˆ   ↵ < 0, that is, the marginal consumer has to be located in country 1. This also
implies that the demand system has to be newly defined, in order to account for the trade
flow reversal. Marginal consumer is thus now identified by solving the following condition:
pT ✓1 + (mˆT ✓   xT ✓1 )2 +  mˆT ✓ = pT ✓2 + (mˆT ✓   xT✓2 )2 +  mˆT ✓, (3.9)
where apex T✓ stands for trade with subsidy. The latter condition, by Lemma 1, yields
the same results as in (2.10-2.11).
If we now suppose that country 2’s government provides to firm 2 a subsidy ✓ > 0 for each
of the ↵  mˆT ✓ units of green good export to country 1, profits of firm 2 become:
⇡T ✓2 = p
T ✓
2 mˆT ✓ + ✓(↵  mˆT ✓); (3.10)
while countries’ social welfares:
SW T ✓1 = ⇡
T ✓
1 + CS
T ✓
1    mˆT ✓; SW T ✓2 = ⇡T ✓2 + CST ✓2   ✓(↵  mˆT ✓); (3.11)
From (3.11), equilibrium social welfare of country 2 is supposed to be reduced by an
amount equal to the subsidy provided to firm 2; this amount can be higher or lower than
the negative externality su↵ered by the community in case of importing the brown good.
As for country 1, the externality in consumption hurts social welfare by a lesser amount
w.r.t. the framework analyzed in section 2 (see (2.9)), since now a part of consumers
switches to the green good produced by firm 2. Again, the equilibrium arising is such that
xT ✓1 = 0 and x
T ✓
2 = 1, implying the following marginal consumer’s equilibrium location:
mˆT ✓ =
3  ✓
6
; (3.12)
where the latter is obviously decreasing in ✓, while equilibrium prices are: pT ✓1 = 1  
✓
3 ; p
T✓
2 = 1  2✓3 . Note that both prices are decreasing in ✓, that is the subsidy strengthens
the price competition stemming from trade liberalisation; this obviously happens since
subsidised firm 2 can now sustain a lower price. Non negativity of both prices is verified
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for ✓ 2]0, 32 [. From the condition of non-negativity of country 1’s imports (mˆT ✓   ↵ < 0)
we can derive minimum level of the subsidy ✓:
✓¯ = 3  6↵. (3.13)
The latter condition is necessary since, similarly to what underlined in the preceding
subsection, for each ✓ < ✓¯ the model would predict a reversal of trade flows with mˆT ✓ > ↵;
which would, again, invalidate the demand system and translate the subsidy into a tari↵ for
firm 2, proportional to the externality generated by the consumption of firm 1’s imported
output. Full market coverage is now ensured if consumers’ surplus is greater than:
sT ✓MC =
1
36
 
45  18  + 36↵    18✓ + 6 ✓ + ✓2  , (3.14)
where, again, sT ✓MC > s
A
p 8 ↵ 2]0, 1/2[,   2]0, 1[, ✓ 2]0, 32 [.
Country 2’ governments objective function is then:
max
✓
SW T ✓2 s.t. ✓   ✓¯, (3.15)
which yields:
✓⇤ =
3
4
(3  4↵) 8 ↵ 2]1
4
,
1
2
[,   2]0, 1].
For ✓ = ✓⇤ the marginal consumer locates at:
mˆ⇤T ✓ =
4(1 + ↵)  3
8
.
Note that, for higher ↵, the gain in demand for firm 2 (↵  mˆ⇤T ✓) is necessarily higher; this
amounts to saying that ✓ can be fixed to a lower level in order to obtain an equivalent rise
in profits (@✓
⇤
@↵ < 0). For ✓ > ✓
⇤, in fact, firm 2’ s demand would rise, accompanied by an
even higher price competition; the consequent increase in consumer surplus of inhabitants
of country 2 would then be not high enough to repay the increase in subsidy expenditure
plus the decrease in firm 2 profits. The subsidy, though directly accruing to firm 2, is
undoubtedly acting in favour of a redistribution from firm 2’s profits to consumer surplus.
For ↵ 2]0, 1/4[ country 2’s government cannot implement ✓⇤ since ✓⇤ < ✓¯, nor a non-
optimal tari↵ ✓ = ✓¯, since the latter would imply a negative price for the brown good.
Under the hypothesis that Government of country 2 levies a ✓⇤ tari↵, we can thus state
what follows:
Proposition 5 [Welfare with Subsidy]The long-run e↵ect of trade liberalisation on social
welfare consists in: (i) an increase in the welfare of the smaller country for a su ciently
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high emission intensity and a su ciently small asymmetry in size between the two coun-
tries; (ii) an increase in the welfare of the larger country if the asymmetry in size is
su ciently small and (iii) an increase in the welfare at the world level for a wider param-
eters’ range w.r.t. the one assuring that both (i) and (ii) hold.
Proof. In order to prove part (i) of Proposition 1 is su cient to observe that, for ✓ = ✓⇤,
↵ 2]14 , 12 [ and   2]0, 1[:
SWT✓1   SWA1 =
1
64
[3  8↵(1 + 2↵(1 + ↵)  4 )  8 ] > 0
iff   2]3  8↵[1 + 2↵(1 + ↵)]
8  32↵ , 1[; (3.16)
while, for what concerns part (ii):
SWT✓2   SWA2 =
1
12
⇥
↵+ 7↵2 + 3↵3 + 8↵  + (    2)    2⇤ > 0
iff ↵ 2]0.452, 0.5[. (3.17)
For what concerns the last claim in the proposition:
SWT✓   SWA = 1
64
[8↵(1 + 4 )  9  8 ] > 0
iff ↵ 2]0.425, 0.5[,   2] 8↵  9
8  32↵ , 1[. (3.18)
The way trade liberalisation a↵ects profits and consumer surpluses is summarised in the
following:
Proposition 6 [Profits and Consumer Surpluses with Subsidy] Free trade, through price
e↵ect, brings about (i) an increase in consumer surpluses of both countries; (ii) a decrease
in profits accruing to both firms.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Hence, di↵erently from the import tari↵ policy (see Proposition 4), the subsidy policy
may entail a rise in the social welfare of country 2 without necessarily hurting country 1;
this requires country 1 to be su ciently large and the emission intensity to be su ciently
high.
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A higher ↵, through a lower equilibrium subsidy ✓⇤ implies a lower transfer from con-
sumers/inhabitants of country 2 to firm 2; moreover, it limits the negative e↵ect on firm
2 profits and the positive e↵ect on consumer surplus associated with any positive subsidy,
since price competition is relaxed. The former two e↵ects are shown to be always stronger
than the latter14 implying that the marginal e↵ect of ↵ on free trade social welfare of coun-
try 2 is strictly positive. Moreover, this is shown to be always greater than the marginal
e↵ect on the social welfare in autarky, since
@SWA2
@↵ < 0; in that case, in fact, a reduction
in the asymmetry between countries entails a decrease in the profits and in the consumer
surplus of country 2, where the former e↵ect is driven by the decrease in demand and the
latter by the increase in the price of the green good.
For what concerns country 1, the e↵ect of ↵ is not a priori defined and depends on the level
of  .15 Consequently, for a higher  , we observe an increase in the burden of externality
borne by inhabitants of country 1 which is clearly higher in autarky than in free trade. In
the latter case, in fact, some of them switch to the clean good. Thus, given
@SWA1
@ 
<
@SW T ✓1
@ 
< 0,
a higher emission intensity, though strictly depressing the social welfare, is always asso-
ciated with an increase in the di↵erential between its post and pre trade liberalisation
equilibrium values.
Proven that   is high enough to account for this positive e↵ect of trade liberalisation,
even ↵ has to be high enough. Size of the smaller country in fact: (i) raises free trade
equilibrium profits through an increase in price and demand (
@mˆ⇤T✓
@↵ > 0), (ii) raises con-
sumer surplus (proven that s > 18
 
3 + 12↵+ 8↵2
 
) and (iii) it determines an increase in
the burden of externality borne by the inhabitants of country 1.
Consequently, for high   and low ↵ the gains from trade liberalisation accruing to country
1 only consist in lower emissions and in a higher consumer surplus, which are not enough
to compensate for the loss in profits; for a high ↵ and a low   the opposite is true: both
the loss in profits and the emissions are strongly reduced by trade liberalisation, but this is
accompanied by a higher reduction in consumer surplus. The latter considerations entails
claim (i) in Proposition 5.
14
    @⇡LS2@↵     >     @CSLS2@↵    .
15From Appendix (A.1), (B.3), in fact, ↵ enters in the autarkic and free trade equilibrium definition of
SW1 multiplied by a factor  .
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2.3.3 Discussion
Along this section we have analyzed the e↵ects of trade liberalisation under the hypoth-
esis of country 2 alternatively undertaking two policies in order to contain trade liber-
alisation’s negative e↵ect, the latter being even reinforced by the externality stemming
from consumption of the imported brown good (see section 2). We may now take a closer
look at the feasibility of trade liberalisation itself, considered as the outcome of a game
where both countries’ payo↵s are represented by social welfare gains w.r.t. the autarkic
equilibrium. Figure 2.1 provides an exhaustive summary of the parameters’ ranges char-
acterizing di↵erent results in terms of social welfare dynamics from autarky to free trade,
for both countries. We may firstly distinguish three ranges, delimiting the feasibility of
both policies. According to results so far provided, for ↵ 2]0, 0.25[ and   2]0, 1   4↵[,
the feasible policy is an optimal tari↵ ⌧ = ⌧⇤; for ↵ 2]0, 0.25[ and   2]1   4↵, 1[, only
a sub-optimal tari↵ policy is allowed and, lastly, for ↵ 2]0.25, 0.5[, the government may
only choose between an optimal subsidy ✓ = ✓⇤ or a suboptimal tari↵ ⌧ = ⌧¯ . Moreover,
in the second range, since  SWA,T ✓2 >  SW
A,T ⌧¯
2 , the government will necessarily choose
a subsidy policy.16
In addition to this, from Proposition 4 and 6, the parameters’ range corresponding to area
A:
↵ 2]0.452, 0.5[;   2]3  8↵[1 + 2↵(1 + ↵)]
8  32↵ , 1[;
is the only one which is compatible with a Nash bargaining solution, since it is associated
with strictly positive  SWA,T ✓1 and  SW
A,T ✓
2 . Both countries have therefore incentive
to open to trade, and trade liberalisation yields:
 SWA,T ✓1 =  SW
A,T ✓
2 =
 SWA,T ✓
2
.
The required side payment is in favour of country 2 for
↵ 2]0.452, 0.478[;   2]15  8↵[3 + 4↵(1 + ↵)]
8  32↵ , 1[;
since in correspondence of this range we have that  SWA,T ✓1 >  SW
A,T ✓
2 . The opposite
is true for the range which is complementary to A.
Anyway, this is not the unique range in which trade liberalisation may be mutually ben-
eficial. From Proposition 5 total world welfare is shown to be strictly increasing in the
16 KA,ji with i = 1, 2, j = T, T ⌧, T✓, and K = SW,CS, TC, p,⇡, indicates the value of the di↵erential
from the autarkic equilibrium to the j-equilibrium for what concerns the magnitude K in country i.
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Figure 2.1: Welfare e↵ects of trade liberalisation with tari↵ and subsidy, parameters’
ranges
following parameter ranges:
↵ 2]0.425, 0.452[;   2] 8↵  9
8  32↵ , 1[; ↵ 2]0.452, 0.5[;   2]
8↵  9
8  32↵ ,
3  8↵[1 + 2↵(1 + ↵)]
8  32↵ [;
respectively labeled as areas B and C in Figure 2.1 . In correspondence of these ranges
the sign of the welfare di↵erential is negative for at least one of the two countries: while
area B is characterized by a gain for country 1 and a loss for country 2, the opposite is
true for area C. In a supergame played over an infinite horizon, this problem could be
e↵ectively solved to generate a Pareto-e cient outcome. Applying Friedman (1971), i.e.,
the perfect folk theorem, the relevant condition is:
1
1    ( SW
A,T ✓
i   Tri)    SWA,T ✓i +
 
1   SW
A
i , (3.19)
where Tri is the required side payment and i = 1, 2 respectively in B and C. It is straight-
forward to show that (3.19) requires
     ˆi = Tri
SW T ✓i   2SWAi
. (3.20)
Condition (3.20) reveals that SW T ✓i < 2SW
A
i su ces to ensure the sustainability of the
Pareto-e cient equilibrium outcome at the subgame perfect equilibrium of the supergame.
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The latter condition is shown to hold for each ↵ and   in C and for each ↵,   and
s > 9 24↵ 48↵
2 32↵3 24 +288↵ 
192↵ in B. If instead s
T ✓
MC < s <
9 24↵ 48↵2 32↵3 24 +288↵ 
192↵ ,
the threshold value of the discount rate  ˆ1 is positive and it remains to be checked whether
it lies below 1. This happens for all Tr1 < SW T ✓1   2SWA1 , whose r.h.s. is linear and
decreasing in s. Therefore, region B also hosts an additional subset of parameters in which
the long run equilibrium generated by the supergame is Pareto-e cient:
s 2
⇣
sT ✓MC , s
⌘
; Tr1 2
⇣
0, SW T ✓1   2SWA1
⌘
where
s ⌘ 9  24↵  48↵
2   32↵3   24  + 288↵ 
192↵
.
This portion of the parameter space is illustrated in Figure 2.2.
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  
Figure 2.2: Threshold discount rate and side-payment, country 1, region B
2.4 The larger country is brown
As we have fully characterized the case in which the smaller country hosts the firm pro-
ducing the brown good, we may now investigate the opposite case: the brown good is
produced in the larger among the two countries. This implies no change in the autarkic
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equilibrium level of all magnitudes except for social welfare:
SWA1 = ⇡
A
1 + CS
A
1 ; SW
A
2 = ⇡
A
2 + CS
A
2    (1  ↵).
At equilibrium, the above expressions write as follows:
SWA1 = ↵(s 
t↵2
12
   ); SWA2 =
1
12
(1  ↵)[12s  t(1  ↵)2]. (4.1)
Note that, while the social welfare of country 2 is negatively a↵ected by the consumption
of the brown good (yA122 = 1 ↵), this does not a↵ect the social welfare of country 1. Non
negativity of both prices still requires imposing (2.8).
At the free trade equilibrium, Lemma 1 still obviously holds, together with (2.9-2.11). Full
market coverage is now ensured if:
s   sTMC =
1
4
[5 + 2 ], (4.2)
where again
sTMC > s
A
p 8↵ 2]0, 1/2[,  2]0, 1[,
so that the condition for full market coverage in the long run also su ces to ensure the
non-negativity of prices in autarky. We still have that, in equilibrium, xT11 = 0, x
T1
2 = 1,
pT11 = p
T1
2 = 1, mˆ = 1/2 and ⇡
T1
1 = ⇡
T1
2 = 1/2. Since the location of the marginal
consumer is the same as in (2.10), the resulting total transportation costs and consumer
surpluses are those in A.2, while social welfare levels are:
SW T1 =
1
2
  ↵(1  s)  1
3
↵3; SW T2 = s(1  ↵) + ↵(1 +
1 + ↵
3
2
)  6  + 7
12
. (4.3)
2.4.1 Trade liberalisation e↵ects
In view of the above considerations about the location of the indi↵erent consumer at the
free trade equilibrium, the present framework fully retains the statements contained in
Proposition 2-3.17 Notwithstanding this, from (4.1) and (4.3) we can state what follows:
Proposition 7 [Welfare] Trade liberalisation causes (i) an increase in the welfare of the
smaller country if the latter is su ciently small; (ii) a decrease in the welfare of the larger
country, irrespective of countries’ relative size; and (iii) an increase in the welfare at the
world level for su ciently high intensity of the emissions stemming from the consumption
of the brown good and su ciently small asymmetry in size between the two countries.
17Note that in the case of profits, (2.13) still holds, but sT1 > s
T
MC , which ensures non-negativity of
prices and full market coverage, is now met for ↵ 2]0, 1 +p2 w 0.414[ and   2]0,min[ 2 5↵+↵32↵ , 1[. This
now implies that (2.13) holds, regardless of the level of  , for ↵ 2]0, 0.289[.
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Proof. See Appendix A.
Proposition (7) thus implies that, when the polluting good is produced in the larger coun-
try, trade liberalisation may be, per se, welfare improving at the world level. Recalling
(3.19) this applies provided that SW T1 < 2SW
A
1 which is trivially shown to hold for each
↵,   and s > 3 6↵ ↵36↵ .
The elementary intuition for this result is that, if the brown firm is based in the
larger country and the position of the indi↵erent consumer under trade liberalisation is
independent of the location of the brown production, then free trade here implies that the
green firm necessarily penetrates the larger country and therefore some consumers in the
latter have access to the green good. This reshu✏ing of aggregate demand at the world
level in favour of the green variety reduces global pollution and opens the way to a welfare
increase at the world level.
2.5 Concluding remarks
We have investigated how the environmental negative externality stemming from con-
sumption a↵ects trade in an international Hotelling duopoly where two firms, that di↵er
in the greenness of their production, are located in asymmetric countries. We have shown
that this kind of externality does not a↵ect equilibrium demand partition: the firm located
in the smaller country, whether producing a “brown” good or not, exports to the larger.
Our results can be contrasted with the original formulation of the model, where no en-
vironmental issues enter the picture (Lambertini (1997a)). In our primary framework (in
which it is assumed that the brown good is produced in the smaller country), consumers’
environmental awareness only implies a reduction in the social welfare of the smaller coun-
try under autarky, and a decrease in the social welfare of the larger country in case of
trade liberalisation. On the contrary, in the same framework, the adoption of a trade
policy by the government of the larger country has been shown to be e↵ective in deter-
mining a change in the distribution of gains and losses stemming from bilateral opening
to trade. In particular, there are admissible parameter ranges in which a Pigouvian tax
on imports implies losses for the smaller country even when the latter is very small, while
improving the performance of the larger one. More interestingly, an export subsidy for
the firm producing the green good delivers a net gain from trade liberalisation accruing to
both countries, provided that the asymmetry in size is su ciently small and the emission
intensity is su ciently high. Hence, the presence of a significant negative externality in
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consumption may be crucial in convincing larger country’s government to subsidise the
firm producing a green good; the reason for this does not consist, as expected, in classic
export subsidy arguments of import substitution, but rather in the fact that consuming
a certain amount of the green good may turn out to be beneficial for the smaller country
too, since benefits directly accruing to the society through reduction in local emissions
may outweigh the decrease in firm’s profits.
The alternative scenario, based on the assumption that the green firm be located in
the larger country, yields intuitive results. Since market shares after trade liberalisation
are the same as in the former setting, here we reach the straightforward conclusion that
free trade indeed generates a welfare improvement at the world level because a portion of
the population of consumers previously compelled to buy the brown variant turn to the
green one.
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Appendices
2.A Autarky and free trade
2.A.1 Equilibrium magnitudes
Autarkic equilibrium, relevant magnitudes others than social welfares:
pA1 = s 
1
4
↵2; pA2 = s 
1
4
(1  ↵)2; (A.1)
⇡A1 =
↵
4
(4s  ↵2); ⇡A2 =
1  ↵
4
[4s  (1  ↵)2];
TCA1 =
1
12
↵3; TCA2 =
1
12
(1  ↵)3;
CSA1 =
1
6
↵3; CSA2 =
1
6
(1  ↵)3.
Free trade equilibrium, relevant magnitudes others than prices and profits:
TCT1 =
↵3
3
; TCT2 =
1
12
 
1  4↵3  ; (A.2)
CST1 = ↵
✓
s  1  1
3
↵
◆
; CST2 = s(1  ↵) +
1
3
✓
3↵+ ↵3   13
4
◆
;
SW T1 =
1
2
  ↵
✓
1  s+   + 1
3
↵2
◆
;
SW T2 =
1
12
  3  4(1 +  )  2 ⇥6s( 1 + ↵)  2↵  3 + ↵2 + (1  6↵) ⇤ .
2.A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. In order to prove part (i) of Proposition 1 is su cient to observe that:
SW T1   SWA1 =
1
4
⇥
2  ↵  4 + ↵2 ⇤ > 0
iff ↵ 2]0, 0.4735[, (A.3)
63
2. Trade Liberalisation between Asymmetric Countries with
Environmentally Concerned Consumers
while, for what concerns part (ii) and (iii):
SW T2   SWA2 =
1
4
⇥
↵
 
3 + ↵+ ↵2 + 4 
   2(1 +  )⇤ ;
SW T   SWA = 1
4
[↵(↵+ 4    1)  2 ]; (A.4)
where SW j is the social welfare at the world level, in correspondence of the j-equilibrium
(with j = A, T, T ⌧, T✓). Both equations in (A.4) are strictly negative over the admissible
range of parameters ↵ and  .
2.A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Consumer surpluses di↵erentials w.r.t. autarky are defined as:
CST1   CSA1 = ↵(s  1) 
1
2
↵2; CST2   CSA2 =
1
4
⇥
6↵+ 2(1  ↵)  2s  ↵2   5⇤ . (A.5)
Both strictly positive over the admissible parameter range ↵ 2]0, 12 [,   2]0, 1[. Then, since
TCT1   TCA1 =
↵3
4
; TCT2   TCA2 =
1
4
↵
 
1  ↵  ↵2  ; (A.6)
are also positive over the admissible parameter range, trade liberalisation always deter-
mines an increase in transportation costs. This implies that, for both countries, the posi-
tive e↵ect on consumers’ surplus determined by the decrease in prices is strong enough to
o↵set the negative one stemming from the dynamic of transportation costs.
2.A.4 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. In order to prove part (i) of Proposition 1 is su cient to observe that, again:
SW T11   SWA11 =
1
4
⇥
2  ↵  4 + ↵2 ⇤ > 0
iff ↵ 2]0, 0.4735[, (A.7)
while, for what concerns part (ii):
SW T12   SWA12 =
1
4
⇥
↵
 
3 + ↵+ ↵2   4    2(1   )⇤ ; (A.8)
where the latter is strictly negative over the admissible range of parameters ↵ and  . With
regards to part (iii) of the proposition, concerning welfare at the world level, we have that:
SW T1   SWA1 = 1
4
[2    ↵ (1  ↵+ 4 )] > 0
iff ↵ 2]0, 0.438[,   2]↵(1  ↵)
2  4↵ , 1[ (A.9)
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2.B Trade policy
2.B.1 Equilibrium magnitudes
Free trade equilibrium, relevant magnitudes for ⌧ = ⌧⇤:
pT ⌧1 =
1
3
(7  4↵+ 2 ); pT ⌧2 =
1
3
(5  2↵+  ); (B.1)
⇡T ⌧1 =
1
18
⇥ 32↵2 + (1   )2 + 2↵(20 + 7 )⇤ ; ⇡T ⌧2 = 118(5  2↵+  )2;
TCT ⌧1 =
↵3
3
; TCT ⌧2 =
1
36
⇥
3  12↵3 + (2  2↵+  )2⇤ ;
CST ⌧1 =
↵[3s+ (4  ↵)↵  2    7]
3
;
CST ⌧2 =
36s(1  ↵) + 4↵[28  ↵(11  3↵)]  14  + 20↵  +  2   71
36
;
SW T ⌧1 =
1
18
⇥
2↵(1  9s+ 8 )  8↵2   6↵3 + (1   )2⇤ ;
SW T ⌧2 =
1
12
⇥
12s(1  ↵) + 4↵  1 + ↵+ ↵2   2  + 8↵  +  2   3⇤ .
Free trade equilibrium, relevant magnitudes for ⌧ = ⌧¯ :
pT ⌧¯1 = 3  4↵; pT ⌧¯2 = 2(1  ↵); (B.2)
⇡T ⌧¯1 = (3  4↵)↵; ⇡T ⌧¯2 = 2(1  ↵)2;
TCT ⌧¯1 =
↵3
3
; TCT ⌧¯2 =
1
3
(1  ↵)3;
CST ⌧¯1 =
1
3
↵[3s+ (12  ↵)↵  9]; CST ⌧¯2 =
1
3
(1  ↵)  3s+ 8↵  ↵2   7  ;
SW T ⌧¯1 = s↵ 
1
3
↵
 
↵2 + 3 
 
; SW T ⌧¯2 =
1
3
 
3s  (1  ↵)2  (1  ↵);
Free trade equilibrium, relevant magnitudes for ✓ = ✓⇤:
pT ✓1 =
1
4
+ ↵; pT ✓2 =  
1
2
+ 2↵;
(B.3)
⇡T ✓1 =
1
32
(1 + 4↵)2; ⇡T ✓2 =
1
32
(1  4↵)(20↵  23);
TCT ✓1 =
1
3
(1  ↵)3; TCT ✓2 =
1
24
↵[15 + 2↵(4↵  9)]  7
64
;
CST ✓1 =
1
64
  1
24
↵
 
9  24s+ 18↵+ 8↵2  ; CST ✓2 = 16(1  ↵)[1 + 6s  2↵(4 + ↵)];
SW T ✓1 =
1
64
(3  8 )  1
24
↵
 
3  24s+ 6↵+ 8↵2 + 12   ; SW T ✓2 = s(1  ↵) + ↵2 + ↵33   1348 .
65
2. Trade Liberalisation between Asymmetric Countries with
Environmentally Concerned Consumers
2.B.2 Optimal tari↵, other e↵ects
In the presence of an optimal tari↵, the long-run e↵ect of trade liberalisation on country
1 still consists in an increase in her welfare for su ciently low intensity of the emissions
stemming from the consumption of the brown good. In fact, for ⌧ = ⌧⇤, ↵ 2]0, 14 [ and
  2]0, 1  4↵[:
SW T ⌧1   SWA1 =
1
36
⇥
2(1   )2   16↵2   9↵3   4↵(1   )⇤ ,
iff   2]0, 1  ↵  3
p
↵2(2 + ↵)p
2
[. (B.4)
From Proposition 4 and (B.4) social welfare at the world level is strictly decreasing in the
presence of an optimal tari↵. For what concerns prices, transportation costs and consumer
surpluses, the introduction of a tari↵ ⌧⇤ implies no di↵erences in the sign of the dynamics
from autarky to free trade, so as we can retain the claims of Proposition 2; for what
concerns profits, on the other hand, free trade may bring about an increase in the profit
accruing to the firm based in the smaller country if the latter is su ciently small and
the emission intensity is su ciently small too, while it always hurts the firm based in the
larger country. For what concerns firm 1, in fact, for ⌧ = ⌧⇤, ↵ 2]0, 14 [ and   2]0, 1  4↵[:
⇡T ⌧1   ⇡A1 =
9↵3 + 2(    1  2↵)2 + 36↵(2  2↵+  )
36
  s↵ > 0,
iff s < sT ⌧1 =
2 + 80↵  64↵2 + 9↵3   4  + 28↵  + 2 2
36↵
, (B.5)
where sT ⌧1 is strictly decreasing in ↵, with s
T ⌧
1 2]1, 12964 +  (3+2 )9 [ as ↵ 2]0, 12 [. Moreover
s < sT ⌧1 is necessary but not su cient condition for (B.5) to hold in equilibrium since also
sT ⌧1 > s
T ⌧
MC , which assures non-negativity of prices and full market coverage, has to be
met. The latter holds for ↵ 2]0, 0.219[ and   2]0, 2(1 7↵2)2+5↵   3
q
↵2+10↵3+19↵4
(2+5↵)2 [ .
For what concerns firm 2:
⇡T ⌧2   ⇡A2 =
27  36s(1  ↵)  9↵[3  (3  ↵)↵] + 2(2  2↵+  )(8  2↵+  )
36
, (B.6)
strictly negative over the whole admissible parameter range.
Hence, these results are not substantially di↵erent from those claimed in Proposition 3,
except for the fact that profits accruing to firm 1 are shown to increase with free trade
uniquely in correspondence of a stricter range of ↵. For firm 1, in fact, the positive quantity
e↵ect of trade liberalisation mˆ   ↵ is now decreasing in ↵ by a factor 23 (which is 1 for
⌧ = 0), implying that the advantage of being located in the smaller country is reduced by
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1
3 . In conclusion, di↵erently from the claim contained in Proposition 1, social welfare of
country 1 is shown to be decreasing even when the latter is very small (for ↵ 2]0, 0.25[),
provided that   is high enough, that is   2]1  ↵  3
p
↵2(2+↵)p
2
, 1  4↵[.
The emission intensity  , in fact, now enters in the long run equilibrium definition of all
relevant magnitudes, through optimal tari↵ ⌧⇤. This has implications with regards to the
dynamics of the social welfare in country 1 inasmuch as a higher   is associated with a rise
in the equilibrium price of the brown variety as well as with a decrease in demand accruing
to firm 1. While the former e↵ect unambiguously leads to a decrease in consumer surplus
for country 1’s consumers, the combination of the two e↵ects may entail an increase in
profits for firm 1, provided that ↵ and   are su ciently high.18
Since the negative e↵ect on consumer surplus is always greater than the positive e↵ect on
firm’s profits, the free trade equilibrium social welfare of country 1 is strictly decreasing
in  :
@SW T ⌧1
@ 
=
1
9
( 1  8↵+  ) < 0 8 ↵ 2]0, 1
4
[,   2]0, 1  4↵[.
Moreover, since
@SWA1
@  =  ↵ (see 2.7), it is always true that @SW
T⌧
1
@  <
@SWA1
@  < 0. Thus,
as   rises, social welfare of country 1 is also necessarily reduced as compared to autarky.
2.B.3 Sub-optimal tari↵
Trade liberalisation, in the presence of a sub-optimal tari↵, brings about a decrease in
both countries’ social welfares. In fact, for ⌧ = ⌧¯ , ↵ 2]0, 12 [ and   2]1 4↵, 1[ we have that
SW T ⌧¯1   SWA1 =  
↵3
4
; SW T ⌧¯2   SWA2 =
1
4
(↵  1)3; (B.7)
are both strictly negative, which also implies  SWA,T ⌧¯ < 0. For what concerns consumer
surpluses we have that
CST ⌧¯1  CSA1 =  
1
6
↵
⇥
6(1  6s) + 4(3  6↵) + 3↵2⇤ ;CST ⌧¯2  CSA2 = 12(↵ 1)  5  2s  6↵+ ↵2  .
(B.8)
Both di↵erentials are strictly positive proven that s > 3   4↵ + ↵2. For what concerns
profits we have that
⇡T ⌧¯1   ⇡A1 =  s↵+
1
36
⇥
36(3  6↵)↵+ 72↵2 + 9↵3⇤ ; (B.9)
⇡T ⌧¯2   ⇡A2 =
27 + 2(3  6↵)(9  6↵) + 36s( 1 + ↵)  9↵[3 + ( 3 + ↵)↵]
36
;
18 @⇡
T⌧
1
@  < 0 8 ↵ 2]0, 17 [,   2]0, 1  7↵[.
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where both di↵erentials are strictly negative.
2.B.4 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. For what concerns part (i), consider that strictly positive consumer surplus dy-
namics:
CST ✓1  CSA1 =
1
4
(1 ↵)[4s 2↵(2+↵) 3]; CST ✓2  CSA2 =
1
64
  1
8
↵
 
3  8s+ 6↵+ 4↵2  ;
(B.10)
are necessarily driven by the decrease in both prices since
TCT ✓1   TCA1 =
8↵[5  2(3  ↵)↵]  7
64
; TCT ✓2   TCA2 =
1
4
(1  ↵)3; (B.11)
are strictly positive. For what concerns part (ii):
⇡T ✓1   ⇡A1 =
1 + 8↵
⇥
(1 + ↵)2   4s⇤
32
; ⇡T ✓2   ⇡A2 =
8↵[11  ↵(7 + ↵)]  15  32s(1  ↵)
32
;
(B.12)
both strictly negative over the whole admissible parameter range.
2.C The e↵ects of trade liberalisation with di↵erent trade
policies
A subsidy policy have been shown to be the sole allowing for free trade as an equilibrium
outcome. Notwithstanding this, we may ask which are the distributive e↵ect of di↵erent
trade policies inside each country, independently of their e↵ectiveness in fostering trade lib-
eralisation. This, in order to assess the desirability of each policy for firms and consumers.
In the following we have then compared, for each relevant magnitude, the di↵erentials
between autarky and free trade equilibrium values in both cases: whether country 2’s
government adopts one of the two policies or not. A few remarkable considerations follow:
• The negative change in both prices driven by trade liberalisation, namely the price
e↵ect, is strictly strengthened by the introduction of a subsidy while it is weakened
by the introduction of a tari↵.
• While the subsidy always determines a sharper increase in transportation costs of
both countries, tari↵ acts only with regards to country 2.
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• A subsidy policy always ensures maximum gain in consumer surpluses, while adop-
tion of a tari↵ policy entails a decrease in consumer surpluses (positive) di↵erential
from autarky to long run.
• When feasible, a subsidy and a sub-optimal tari↵ ⌧ = ⌧¯ always entail minimum
equilibrium firms’ profits in free trade.
In detail, for ↵ 2]0, 0.25[ and   2]0, 1  4↵[:
 pA,T ⌧1 <  p
A,L
1 < 0;  p
A,T ⌧
2 <  p
A,L
2 < 0;
 TCA,T ⌧1 =  TC
A,L
1 > 0;  TC
A,T ⌧
2 >  TC
A,L
2 > 0;
 CSA,L1 >  CS
A,T ⌧
1 > 0;  CS
A,L
2 >  CS
A,T ⌧
2 > 0;
 ⇡A,T ⌧1 7  ⇡
A,L
1 ; 0 >  ⇡
A,T ⌧
2 >  ⇡
A,L
2 ;
In this range the only feasible policy is a ⌧ = ⌧⇤ tari↵ policy which is detrimental for
the free trade equilibrium value of all relevant magnitudes, except for firm 2’s profits: it
implies higher prices, higher or constant transport costs, lower consumer surpluses and
lower firm 1’s profits; it is straightforward to note that while social welfare of country 1
would be strictly higher in case no tari↵ is introduced, loss in social welfare of country 2
is reduced under a tari↵ scheme. This is due to the fact that the rise in firm 2 profits,
together with the gross tari↵ revenues of country 2, more than compensate the reduction
in consumer surplus.
In correspondence of area D, that is for ↵ 2]0, 0.25[ and   2]1  4↵, 1[:
 pA,L1 <  p
A,T ⌧¯
1 < 0;  p
A,L
2 <  p
A,T ⌧¯
2 < 0.
 TCA,T ⌧¯1 =  TC
A,L
1 > 0;  TC
A,T ⌧¯
2 >  TC
A,L
2 > 0.
 CSA,L1 >  CS
A,T ⌧¯
1 > 0;  CS
A,L
2 > 0 >  CS
A,T ⌧¯
2 .
 ⇡A,L1 > 0 >  ⇡
A,T ⌧¯
1 ;  ⇡
A,L
2 > 0 >  ⇡
A,T ⌧¯
2 .
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Here, a ⌧¯ tari↵ policy still entails a redistribution of welfare from country 1 to country
2 which consists in a in a reduction of welfare loss for country 2 and in a welfare loss
for country 1 that would have risen in the absence of a policy. Notwithstanding this, the
choice between adopting a tari↵ or not has a significant implication from the point of view
of the distribution of welfare between firms and consumers/inhabitants.
For what concerns country 1, reduction in welfare stems from a lower gain in consumer
surplus (given a softer price e↵ect) and from an even higher reduction in firm’s profits
(due to a contraction in demand).
For what concerns country 2, reduction in welfare loss stems from a higher decrease in
consumer surplus (given a softer price e↵ect) outweighed by a lower reduction in firm’s
profits (given a softer price e↵ect and an increase in demand). Then, again, the tari↵
policy acts in favour of a redistribution from country 2 consumer surplus to firm 2 profits:
the positive e↵ect on aggregate surplus di↵erential is due to a minor loss in firm 2 profits.
For ↵ 2]0.25, 0.5[:
 pA,T ✓1 <  p
A,L
1 < 0;  p
A,T ✓
2 <  p
A,L
2 < 0;
 TCA,T ✓1 >  TC
A,L
1 > 0;  TC
A,T ✓
2 >  TC
A,L
2 > 0;
 CSA,T ✓1 >  CS
A,L
1 > 0;  CS
A,T ✓
2 >  CS
A,L
2 > 0;
 ⇡A,T ✓1 < 0 <  ⇡
A,L
1 ;  ⇡
A,T ✓
2 < 0 <  ⇡
A,L
2 ;
Here, the only feasible policy is a ✓ = ✓⇤ subsidy policy which, with respect to a no-
policy scenario, has been shown to strengthen the positive e↵ect of trade liberalisation on
consumer surpluses and limit its negative e↵ect on profits. With regards to country 2,
this entails an improvement in social welfare as compared to autarky, which may result
in a loss reduction or even in a gain. On the contrary, for country 1, the subsidy policy
implies a worsening of the social welfare di↵erential, until ↵ and   are not high enough.
For high ↵ and  , in fact, the reduction of externality which stems from importing and
consuming a clean good, outweighs losses in consumer surplus and firms profits. Condition
for  SWA,T ✓1 >  SW
A,L
1 is:
↵ 2]0.4587, 1[;   2]29  56↵+ 16↵
2
8(4↵  1) , 1[.
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3. Trade Costs, FDI Incentives, and the Intensity of Price Competition
3.1 Introduction
The standard theory of multinational enterprises suggests that a decrease in trade tari↵s
would reduce the amount of foreign direct investment (FDI).1 Indeed, the adoption of FDIs
has the aim to avoid tari↵s by installing productive capacity in the country of the market
where the firm operates (the so-called tari↵-jumping argument). Nonetheless, stylized
facts on FDIs show that the increase in trade liberalization has led in fact to an increase
in the volume of FDIs.2
The developments in the literature on multinational enterprises focus on the relation-
ship between the likelihood of FDI and distance, which depends crucially on the type of
FDI considered. In particular horizontal FDIs are more likely the higher the transporta-
tion costs.3 When FDI is vertical instead, the aim is to save on costs in a particular
production stage (Helpman (1984)). In this case trade is more likely directed towards rel-
atively close markets, and vertical FDI is a complement of trade rather than a substitute,
since trade flows will occur intra-firm, and economic distance adds costs to the firm. In
a recent contribution, Collie (2011) explains the paradox in a setting with two regions
and two countries in each of them, Cournot competition and linear costs. He shows that
multilateral trade liberalization may induce firms to shift from exporting to FDIs if the
inter-regional transport cost is su ciently high.4
We propose an alternative explanation in a setting where two Bertrand firms, sup-
plying a homogeneous good with a convex cost function, enter the market of a foreign
country. They choose between exporting, which involves a linear cost associated with
either shipping or tari↵s, or undertaking FDIs, involving a sunk cost. We model Bertrand
competition as in Dastidar (1995), yielding a continuum of Nash equilibria, ranging also
above marginal cost pricing.5 Our results show that the paradox of an increase in FDI
as trade liberalization increases can be explained on the basis of firms’ ability to tune the
intensity of price competition in the host market, provided the FDI sunk costs are su -
ciently low for the FDI strategy to be viable. The result relies on the fact that softening
competition raises firms’ mark-up and this, in turn, may o↵set the cost of opening a new
1Some relevant contributions in this field are Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Motta (1992) and
Rowthorn (1992) inter alia.
2See Markusen (2004) and Navaretti and Venables (2004).
3See, e.g., Horstmann and Markusen (1987); Brainard (1993); Markusen and Venables (1998); ?.
4An alternative and solid explanation to this paradox can be found in the literature on tax competition
and FDI, according to which trade libelisation can increase FDI if countries favour foreign investments
through a low taxation. Some noteworthy contributions are Janeba (1995), Haufler and Wooton (1999,
2006), Ra↵ (2004) and Davies, Egger, and Egger (2010), inter alia.
5Dastidar’s (1995) result is further generalised in a repeated setting by Weibull (2006).
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3.2 The model
We consider a world with two countries, labelled 1 and 2. In country 1 there are two firms,
labelled A and B. They produce the same homogeneous good, and have symmetric and
convex production costs:
C = cq2, (B.1)
where q is the quantity produced by each firm and c > 0. Consider a scenario in which
both firms can supply the market of country 2, hosting no home firms at all. Let the
inverse demand expressed by consumers of country 2 be linear:
p = 1  2q. (B.2)
Firms A and B can enter country 2 in two alternative ways, namely, by (i) exporting from
country 1 or (ii) undertaking FDIs. In the first case, they bear a cost t 2 (0, 1) for each
unit exported, which can be interpreted either as a transportation cost or a tari↵, and
thus obtaining profits:
⇡ex = pq   cq2   tq, (B.3)
while in the alternative case they incur the sunk costs k > 0, with profits:
⇡FDI = pq   cq2   k. (B.4)
3.3 Results
According to Dastidar (1995), if firms have symmetric convex costs and compete a` la
Bertrand, the Nash equilibrium is necessarily non-unique. In particular, a pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium is characterized by both firms setting the same price p⇤, which is bounded
by two thresholds pavc  p⇤  pu. The lower bound pavc (the superscript avc stands for
average variable cost) equals average variable costs, letting firms be indi↵erent between
either producing at p⇤ or producing nothing at all. The upper bound pu (with superscript
u standing for undercutting) is the price at which firms are indi↵erent between choosing
price pu, and marginally undercutting it in order to capture the entire demand at pu.
If both firms export from their respective home plants, the level of pavc is given by
equating the inverse demand function to the average variable cost (which includes the
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trading cost):
1  2q = cq + t, (B.5)
then solving for q and substituting in the demand function we obtain:
pavcex =
c+ 2t
2 + c
. (B.6)
The upper bound of the equilibrium price obtains by imposing indi↵erence between duopoly
profits (B.3) and the monopoly profits generated by undercutting:
pq   cq2   tq = 2pq   4cq2   2tq. (B.7)
Solving for p, we obtain
pucex =
3c+ 2t
2 + 3c
. (B.8)
Finally, by equating the inverse demand function to the marginal cost, solving for q and
substituting into p, we obtain the price equal to marginal cost:
pmcex =
c+ t
1 + c
, (B.9)
where the superscript mc stands for marginal cost pricing.
The continuum of Nash equilibria can be represented by the following expression:6
p⇤ex =
c+ (2  ↵) t
2 + c  ↵ . (B.10)
Parameter ↵ represents the relative intensity of price competition between firms. Note
that, when ↵ = 0, in equilibrium price equals average variable cost; ↵ = 1 corresponds to
the Bertrand reference case in which price is equal to marginal cost, while at ↵ = 4/3 the
price attains the highest level above which undercutting takes place. As a consequence,
↵ 2 [0, 4/3] . Using (B.10), the individual profit function (B.3) writes:
⇡⇤ex =
↵c (2  ↵) (1  t)2
4 (2 + c  ↵)2 . (B.11)
The per-firm equilibrium profits obtained by undertaking FDI can be easily found by
setting t = 0 in equation (B.11) and subtracting the FDI sunk cost k:
⇡⇤FDI =
↵c (2  ↵)
4 (2 + c  ↵)2   k. (B.12)
6For an analogous application of Dastidar’s (1995) approach, see Andre´, Gonzlez, and Porteiro (2009).
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Of course, in order for ⇡⇤FDI to be positive, the following condition must hold:
7
k < bk = ↵c (2  ↵)
4 (2 + c  ↵)2 . (B.13)
the straightforward implication of (B.13) is that exporting is the only viable strategy for
all k > bk. By comparing ⇡⇤ex with ⇡⇤FDI , it emerges that ⇡⇤FDI   ⇡⇤ex > 0 for all
k < ek = ↵c (2  ↵) (2  t) t
4 (2 + c  ↵)2 . (B.14)
Finally, note that: bk   ek = ↵c (2  ↵) (1  t)2
4 (2 + c  ↵)2 > 0. (B.15)
This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1 For all k 2
h
0,eki, both firms undertake FDIs to install capacity in the
host country. For all k > ek, both firms choose to export from their home sites.
We are now in a position to exploit this result in order to explain the puzzle by which
trade liberalization leads to an increase in the volume of FDIs. This can be ascertained by
evaluating the overall e↵ect on ek, whose increase expands the space for FDIs, of variations
in (i) t, whose decrease leads to an increase in trade liberalization, and (ii) ↵, which
represents an inverse measures of the intensity of price competition.
Totally di↵erentiating ek yields:
dek = @ek
@t
dt+
@ek
@↵
d↵ = (B.16)
↵c (2  ↵) (1  t)
2 (2 + c  ↵)2 dt+
c [2 + c  ↵ (1 + c)] (2  t) t
2 (2 + c  ↵)3 d↵.
The existing literature on FDIs confines itself to the discussion of @ek/@t, which is usually
positive and therefore delivers the clearcut message that trade liberalization jeopardizes
FDI incentives. In the present model, this e↵ect can be (more than) counterbalanced by
the price behaviour of firms, provided @ek/@↵ > 0, in such a way that a decrease in t may
indeed be accompanied by a constant or even increasing level of ek, in accordance with
empirical observation.
Examining (B.16), one observes that the coe cient of @ek/@t is unambiguously positive
for all admissible values of parameters. This feature is fully in line with the established
7This must be imposed as we are not imposing the price to cover average total costs.
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theoretical wisdom dating back to Horstmann and Markusen (1992), Motta (1992) and
Rowthorn (1992). Instead, the partial derivative @ek/@↵ is positive for all
↵ 2

0,max
⇢
2 + c
1 + c
,
4
3
 ◆
, (B.17)
with
lim
c!0
2 + c
1 + c
= 2 and lim
c!1
2 + c
1 + c
= 1. (B.18)
Now note that
max
⇢
2 + c
1 + c
,
4
3
 
=
4
3
8 c > 2, (B.19)
so that for c  2, the sign of @ek/@↵ is unambiguously positive and may be large enough to
compensate the e↵ect generated by a decrease in trade barriers so as to restore or enhanced
FDIs. For all c > 2, the sign of @ek/@↵ depends instead on the level of ↵: in particular,
it becomes negative for all ↵ 2 ((2 + c) / (1 + c) , 4/3] . A portray of this result is o↵ered
in Figure 3.1, where the region ↵ 2 [0,max {(2 + c) / (1 + c) , 4/3}) is one in which raising
prices (i.e., increasing ↵) may in fact lead to a reversal of the traditional tari↵-jumping
argument. Intuitively, the region in which this happens shrinks as marginal cost c becomes
higher, but never disappears, as (B.18) proves.
Therefore firms starting, say, from the point (2, 1) , and facing a decrease in trade barriers,
might restore their own FDI incentives by moving vertically in the direction of a more
remunerative mark-up.
Figure 3.1: Pricing behaviour and FDI incentives
6
-
0,0
2
4/3
1
2+c
1+c
↵
c
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The foregoing discussion can be summarised in
Proposition 2 In the parameter region identified by ↵ 2
h
0,max
n
2+c
1+c ,
4
3
o⌘
, an appro-
priate increase in the mark-up may o↵set the negative e↵ect of trade liberalization on FDI
incentives.
That is, the standard e↵ect associated with a decrease in trade barriers (i.e., a mono-
tone positive relationship between trade costs and FDIs) can indeed flip over if accompa-
nied by a higher mark-up, su cient to make it easier (and indeed attractive) for firms to
bear the sunk cost of a new plant abroad. An alternative way of reading Proposition 1
is that ek defines a map of negatively sloped isoquants in the space (↵, t) for all c  2; in
this range, ↵ and t behave as substitutes and therefore any decrease in trade barriers may
be exactly counterbalanced and even more than o↵set by an increase in ↵. Otherwise, if
c > 2, these isoquants become positively sloped for all ↵ 2 ((2 + c) / (1 + c) , 4/3] while
remaining negatively sloped anywhere else. Accordingly, one could reformulate Propo-
sition 1 by saying that in the parameter range in which ↵ and t behave as substitutes,
FDI incentives jeopardized by trade liberalization may be fully restored by exploiting the
continuum of Bertrand-Nash equilibria to fine tuning the firms’ profit margin.
To complete the picture, we briefly discuss the di↵erent implications on the social
welfare of the host country in the two alternative situations. In the case of export, one
can consider t, alternatively, as (i) a transportation cost or (ii) a tari↵. If t represents
a transportation cost, the host country’s social welfare trivially coincides with its own
consumer surplus, i.e.:
W tcex =
(2  ↵)2 (1  t)2
2 (2 + c  ↵)2 , (B.20)
where superscript tc stands for transportation cost. Obviously, any increase in trans-
portation costs hinders consumer surplus. Instead, if t is a tari↵, then the related revenue
contributes to the host country’s social welfare, together with consumer surplus:
W taex =
(2  ↵) (1  t) [2  ↵+ t (2 (1 + c)  ↵)]
2 (2 + c  ↵)2 , (B.21)
where the superscript ta stands for tari↵. Clearly, W taex > W
tc
ex. Moreover, as t here
becomes a policy instrument in the hands of the host country’s government, is can be
easily established that
@W taex
@t
/ c  t [2 (1 + c)  ↵] = 0 (B.22)
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in
t⇤ =
c
2 (1 + c)  ↵ (B.23)
Finally, in the case of FDI, again the host country’s social welfare is given by its
consumer surplus (the same as (B.20), with t = 0):
WFDI =
(2  ↵)2
2 (2 + c  ↵)2 . (B.24)
We now compare the three alternatives. First note that WFDI > W tcex for all t > 0, while
WFDI < W taex for all:
t <
2c
2 (1 + c)  ↵ , (B.25)
leading to
Corollary 1 The host country’s social welfare ranking is W taex > WFDI > W
tc
ex.
This amounts to saying that imports are preferred to FDIs if and only if t can be
controlled by the host country to generate revenues more than o↵setting the negative
e↵ect on consumer surplus.
3.4 Concluding remarks
In a Bertrand setting generating a continuum of price equilibria, we have revisited the
puzzle concerning the relationship between trade liberalization and FDIs, to illustrate
the theoretical possibility that the apparent hiatus between theory and observation may
indeed be traced back to the role of strategic pricing, so far overlooked in the discussion
on this issue. Our analysis, based on Dastidar (1995), has shown that the traditional
negative e↵ect caused by lowering trade barriers on FDIs may in fact be neutralized by
increasing the mark-up appropriately. This delivers a hint for empirical research, as one
could test the prediction of the present model by checking whether the observed increase
in FDIs going along with trade liberalization is also accompanied by higher prices.
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